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PROTECTING THE WHISTLEBLOWER 
FROM RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 
Martin H. Malin* 
"Whistleblowing," the disclosure by an employee of his employer's 
improper activities, has received widespread attention in recent years. 
Whistle blowers have been branded everything from moral heroes 1 to 
gadflies, 2 though recent case studies suggest that whistleblowers tend 
merely to be ordinary employees who are so troubled by their employers' 
conduct that they feel compelled to take action. 3 Frequently, their 
employers respond to such action by terminating their employment. 4 
Employees fired for whistleblowing often have no recourse against their 
employer for this retaliatory discharge. 
Much of the judicial and scholarly debate in this area has focused 
on the whistleblower's utility to society. Case law and commentators 
attempt to balance society's interest in using the whistleblowing employee 
to expose wrongdoing which might otherwise go undiscovered against 
the employer's interest in maintaining employee loyalty. The standards 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
B.A., 1973 Michigan State University, J .D., 1976 George Washington University. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Renee Atlas, Joan Eagle, and Valeree Marek, 
all members of the Class of 1983, IIT /Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
I. See Engineers as Moral Heroes, 2 PERSPS. ON PROFS., Mar.-June 1982, at 3. 
2. See, e.g., Shabecoff, Persistent Whistle-Blower at £.P.A., N.Y. Times, April 14, 1982, 
at A20, col. 4. 
3. Having examined these and other cases, I am convinced that the employees involved 
are neither neurotics nor misfits nor malcontents. Indeed, most are middle Americans, 
with no intrinsic animus toward capitalism or records of political radicalism. They are 
people who found themselves troubled over some things their employers were doing. 
One put the matter very simply: "I reached a point where I could no longer live with 
myself." We have always claimed we are creatures of conscience. Here are individuals 
who acted on that principle. 
Hacker, Loyalty - and the Whistle Blower, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION 85, 
89 (A. Westin & s. Salisbury eds. 1980). See generally A. WESTIN, WHISTLEBLOWING! LOYALTY 
AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION (1981). 
4. Some whistleblowers have experienced more retaliation than simply loss of their jobs. For 
example, when a Census Bureau employee reported that her boss, a politically well-connected 
manager of a regional office, was using his position to coerce sexual favors from female employees, 
making the office a vehicle for his political organizing, and neglecting the basic duties of the 
Census office, the boss not only fired her but used his influence with a local judge to obtain 
an ex parte order relieving her of custody of her children. Eventually the boss was indicted for 
conspiracy to defraud the government, false statements, illegal patronage hiring, and obstructing 
a criminal investigation. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a year in prison and three years 
probation. Census Worker Fought for Right, But Didn't Count on Such a War, Chicago Tribune, 
June 3, 1982, § 3, at 1, col. I. 
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that have evolved for protecting whisteblowers reflect this characteriza-
tion of the relevant interests. 
This approach to the problem of whistleblowing, however, is mis-
guided; the appropriate balance is between the employee's interest in 
acting in accordance with his individual conscience and his duty of 
loyalty to his employer. This Article argues that although the law should 
protect individual acts of whistleblowing once they have occurred, it 
should not affirmatively encourage whistleblowing. Part I discusses the 
protection currently available to whistleblowers under the common law, 
collective bargaining agreements, and the antiretaliation provisions of 
several important statutes. Part II proposes a general standard of 
whistleblower protection that is designed to protect individual 
whistleblowers in appropriate circumstances, but which will not ac-
tively promote such conduct. Part III develops remedies for retaliatory 
discharge which, like the standard advocated in part II, will protect 
past whistleblowers without encouraging future whistleblowing. The 
Article concludes that, unless there is a violation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, a discharged whistleblower should be given a remedy 
that includes future damages, rather than the traditional labor law 
remedy of reinstatement. 5 
I. CURRENT SOURCES OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 
A. Common Law 
Historically, an employment contract of indefinite duration was term-
inable at the will of either party. 6 Although most jurisdictions retain 
5. Public sector employees are outside the scope of this Article. Such employees may, in 
appropriate cases, find protection in civil service statutes or in the Constitution. See, e.g., Com-
ment, Government Employee Disclosures of Agency Wrongdoing: Protecting the Right to Blow 
the Whistle, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 530 (1975). The federal government and a few state govern-
ments have also enacted specific whistleblower protection laws which protect their employees. 
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8)-(9) (Supp. II 1978); Frazier v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 
672 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing legislative history and application of 5 U.S.C. §§ 
2302(b)(8)-(9)); IND. CODE §§ 4-15-2-34 to -35 (1981), amended by Acts 1982, P.L. 23, sec. 30; 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1169 (West 1981); N.Y. Clv. SERv. LAW§ 736 (McKinney 1978); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 240.316(5)(a-d) as amended by ch. 155, L. 1981. 
6. Commentators have discussed and criticized at length the development of the employment 
at will doctrine. In addition to the Articles and Student Notes in Individual Rights in the Workplace: 
The At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 199 (1983), see Blackburn, Restricted Employer 
Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); 
Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of 
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised 
by At Will Employees: a New Legal Concern for Employers, 32 LAB. L.J. 265 (1981); Peck, 
Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. I 
(1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. 
L. REV. 481 (1976); Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 211 (1974); Comment, Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Right of 
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this common law rule, 7 courts in a number of states have formulated 
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine when the discharge has 
Discharge for Cause, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 697 (1981); Note, A Remedy for Malicious Discharge 
of the At-Will Employee: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 1 CONN. L. REV. 758 (1975); Note, 
Contracts - Employment At Will - New Hampshire Supreme Court Recognizes Cause of Ac-
tion for Malicious Discharge - Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 700 (1975); 
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only 
in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note). Note, Im-
plied Contract Rights to Job Security 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974). 
7. See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982). Courts in the following 16 jurisdictions 
have refused to deviate from the employment-at-will doctrine: Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 
1980); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Stephens v. Justiss-
Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Ter~io v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 
379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977); Kelley v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874'(Miss. ·1981); 
Tolliver v. Standard Oil Co., 431 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. 1968); Gonzales v. United Southwest Nat'! 
Bank of Santa Fe, 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. 
App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Sand v. Queen 
Packing Co., 108 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1961); Henkel v. Educational Research Council of America, 
45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976); School Comm. v. Board of Regents for Educ., 
112 R.l. 288, 308 A.2d 788 (1973); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 
812 (1979); Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Bohlmaier 
v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Blevins v. General Elec. Co., 491 F. Supp. 521,525 (W.D. 
Va. 1980). But see Buie v. Daniel Int'! Corp., 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118 (1982) (Dockery 
superceded by statute protecting employees fired for filing workers' compensation claims). 
Courts in eight other jurisdictions, although suggesting in dicta that in appropriate circumstances 
they might afford a cause of action to a discharged at-will employee, have refused to find such 
a cause of action on the facts before them. See, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 
507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 
681 (1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); 
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Scroghan v. Kraftco 
Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980); 
Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 
290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). The issue has been specifically left open in Iowa and 
Nebraska. See, e.g., Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Mau 
V. Omaha Nat') Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980). But cf. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-
WILL ISSUE, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 33-65 (analyzing state court decisions and 
finding that 21 stores adhere to at-will and 29 recognize exceptions). 
Although a few jurisdictions stop short of creating an exception to the at-will doctrine, they 
have nonetheless read limitations on the employer's power to discharge into the employment 
contract. Even in these jurisdictions, however, common law contractual remedies are not likely 
to provide much relief to the employee who is discharged for whistleblowing. For example, the 
Michigan Supreme Court has held that an employment contract created by express oral or writ-
ten agreement or through the employer's personnel policies, such as those contained in a person-
nel manual, may contain an enforceable promise to discharge only for just cause. Toussaint 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). Accord Simpson v. Western 
Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982); see also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 
111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). The court did not, however, totally abrogate 
the employment-at-will doctrine. Employers may require employees to acknowledge that they 
may be terminated at will. The use of disclaimers of discharge for cause, if widespread, could 
easily strip employees of the protection provided by Toussaint. See Comment, Job Security for 
the At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 57 CHI. KENT L. REv. 697, 
730-33 (1981). 
The other jurisdictions affording contractual protection to discharged employees have done 
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been contrary to public policy. 8 The law is in utter disarray, however, 
over whether and when an employee discharged for whistleblowing has 
a cause of action against his employer. 
In jurisdictions strictly adhering to the employment-at-will doctrine, 
the discharged whistleblower has no remedy. 9 Maus v. National Liv-
so by requiring that the employer exercise its power to discharge in good faith. See, e.g., Fortune 
v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber 
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, has 
since restricted Monge to situations were the discharged employee "performed an act that public 
policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn." Howard 
v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980). Most recently, in Cloutier 
v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981), the court interpreted Monge 
and Howard to require both a showing of employer bad faith and a violation of public policy. 
In Fortune, the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not imply a good faith requirement into every 
employment contract. Rather, it limited its holding to implying a good faith requirement for 
the termination of an employee otherwise entitled to commissions for work already performed. 
373 Mass. at 103-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57. The court has twice reiterated the narrowness of 
its holding. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, & n.5, ·429 N.E.2d 
21, 26 (1981), Richey v. American Auto. Ass'n, 1980 Mass Adv. Sh. 1425, 406 N.E.2d 675, 
678 (1980). 
A further issue is whether the required good faith is to be evaluated against a subjective or 
objective standard. Massachusetts appears to require subjective good faith, see Gram, 429 N.E.2d 
at 24, (equating bad faith termination with malice), while New Hampshire appears to analyze 
the employer's good faith objectively, see Cloutier, 121 N.H. at 921-22, 436 A.2d at 1143-44. 
Although some commentators have equated the requirement of good faith with just cause, See, 
e.g., Blackburn, supra note 6, at 490; Harvard Note supra note 6, at 1839-41, the only court 
to consider the issue thus far has rejected the equation. Gram, 429 N.E.2d at 26. The discharge 
of a whistleblower has frequently been justified as necessary to enforce employee loyalty, to 
avoid disruptions of employee morale, to preserve internal company security and audit procedures, 
and to avoid public embarrassment of the employer. Such reasons would clearly establish subjec-
tive good faith on the part of the employer. Cf. Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 377, 
290 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (even if court were to adopt Monge, employer who 
discharged employee for living out of wedlock with coemployee acted in good faith). Yet, even 
if the good faith requirement is interpreted objectively to require just cause, these reasons may 
be sufficient to establish just cause. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. 
8. A tort of abusive discharge has been recognized and applied in at least eleven jurisdic-
tions: See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. 
Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); 
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) rev'g 85 Ill. 
App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (1980); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 
N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dept. of Labor Serv., 6 Kan. 
App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Teays v. Supreme Concrete Block, Inc., 51 Md. App. 166, 
441 A.2d 1109 (1982); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); 
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 
536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 
(1978); also Harless v. First Nat'! Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). 
9. See, e.g., Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Goodroe v. 
Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Maus v. National Living Centers, 
Inc., 633 S. W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). A wrongfully discharged employee may attempt 
to recover under other tort theories but will encounter many obstacles. For example, an employee 
who sues for defamation must deal with the employer's qualified privilege. See Walsh v. Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 355-58, 563 P.2d 1205, 1210-11 (1977). An action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the employee to establish that the employer's 
conduct was outrageous, a showing that is difficult to make if the employer has a legal right 
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ing Centers, Inc. 10 illustrates the harsh result of this rule. Plaintiff, 
a nurse's aid employed at defendant's nursing home, was terminated 
because she frequently complained to her superiors that patients were 
being neglected. One such complaint concerned the refusal of defen-
dant's director of nursing to call a doctor for a patient who had suf-
fered a stroke. Although the plaintiff had administered CPR and kept 
the patient alive for several days, the patient eventually died. The Texas 
Court of Appeals acknowledged the trend in other jurisdictions toward 
limiting the employer's right to terminate at will and noted that a Texas 
statute made it a misdemeanor to fail to report the abuse or neglect 
of nursing home patients to the state licensing agency or local law en-
forcement authorities. Nevertheless, the court viewed itself bound by 
the long standing terminable-at-will doctrine. Focusing upon the dearth 
of Texas Supreme Court precedent recognizing the tort of abusive 
discharge and the legislature's failure to protect employees reporting 
patient abuse from employer retaliation, the Maus court held that plain-
tiff was not entitled to protection. 
Jurisdictions recognizing the tort of abusive discharge have taken 
divergent positions on whether and under what circumstances the 
discharge of a whistle blower violates public policy. The least protec-
tive of these jurisdictions requires specific and clearly applicable 
legislative declarations of policy before affording a cause of action. 11 
Under this view a discharge is actionable only where it stems from 
the employee's exercise of a statutory right, such as the filing of a 
workers' compensation claim, 12 or from the employee's refusal to under-
take an action prohibited by statute. 13 Nevertheless, because employees 
to fire at will. Compare Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 53, 406 
N.E.2d 595, 598 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1980) with 
Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., IOI Ill. App. 3d 75, 80-81, 427 N.E.2d 829, 833-34 (1981). 
Moreover, it is unclear whether a cause of action under these traditional tort theories will be 
barred by the immunity conferred on employers by workers' compensation statutes. See generally 
2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 68.33-68.34 (1982). 
10. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982). 
II. See Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (re-
jecting public policy exception where plaintiff relied on general policy rather than specific statutory 
declaration). 
12. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton 
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 
Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 
(1978); see also Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1979) (employee 
discharged for refusal to take lie detector test has a cause of action in light of statute making 
it a misdemeanor to require such a test as a condition of employment). 
13. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusal to par-
ticipate in illegal price fixing scheme); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 
P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refusal to participate in illegal price fixing scheme); Peter-
mann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (refusal 
to commit perjury); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 
265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusal to falsify pollution control reports); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 
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generally have no statutory right or obligation to report their superiors' 
improper or illegal conduct, 14 the whistleblower usually is left without 
any remedy for his discharge. 15 In these courts' view, the discharge 
"involves only a corporate management dispute and lacks ... a clearly 
mandated public policy"; 16 thus, it does not give rise to an action for 
abusive discharge. 
Other jurisdictions have adopted a slightly more protective approach. 
Although they too insist that a legislative declaration of public policy 
is a necessary element of the tort of abusive discharge, they find cer-
tain statutes to embody such a declaration. 11 For example, in Harless 
v. First National Bank, 18 the court afforded plaintiff a cause of action 
where he was discharged in retaliation for his efforts to correct his 
employer's violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Pro-
tection Act. The court recognized that the legislature had intended to 
create a clear public policy that consumers of credit subject to the Act 
were to receive protection, and insisted that [s]uch manifest public 
policy should not be frustrated by a holding that an employee of a 
lending institution covered by the Act, who seeks to ensure ... com-
N.J. Super. 416, -390 A.2d 149 (1978) (refusal to perform illegally a catherization for which 
employee was not trained); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 
JI 9 (1978) (refusal to avoid jury service by committing perjury). 
14. Failure to report a felony generally does not constitute a misprison of felony unless it 
is accompanied by an affirmative act of concealment. United States v. Hodges, 566 F.2d 674 
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Daddans, 
432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905 (1971). 
15. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980) (employee dis-
charged for advising employer's counsel of violations by his superiors of the federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetics Act); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1979) (employees discharged 
for reporting to company officials solicitation by their immediate superiors of kickbacks from 
company suppliers); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 
710 (1982) (employee discharged for complaining about internal accounting practice which could 
have impeded the Public Service Commission's ability to regulate); Geary v. United States Steel 
Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (employee discharged for advising corporate officer 
that product was unsafe). 
16. Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 696, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 
(1982). In Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), the court, 
in denying the plaintiff a cause of action even though he was fired after his complaints to a 
company vice-president that a new product was unsafe led to the withdrawal of the product 
from the market, reasoned: 
There is nothing here from which we could infer that the company fired Geary for 
the specific purpose of causing him harm, or coercing him to break any law or other-
wise to compromise himself. According to his own averments, Geary had already won 
his own battle within the company. The most natural inference from the chain of 
events ... is that Geary had made a nuisance of himself, and the company discharged 
him to preserve administrative order in its own house. 
Id. at 180, 319 A.2d at 178 (footnotes omitted). 
_ 17. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 178 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Kalman 
v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (1982); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 
246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). 
18. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). 
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pliance . . . can be discharged without being furnished a cause of ac-
tion for such discharge. 19 
Even in these more protective jurisdictions, though, the whistleblower 
carries the heavy burden of pleading and proying the statutory viola-
tions. Adler v. American Standard Corp. 20 illustrates this burden. Plain-
tiff was discharged for reporting to the employer's headquarters im-
proper activities of his superiors including attempts to treat capital ex-
penditures as expenses, payment of commercial bribes, falsification of 
sales and income information, misuse of corporate funds for personal 
benefit, manipulation of inventory information, and alteration of 
forecasts in connection with intra-corporate financial reporting. In deny-
ing the plaintiff protection, the Maryland Court of Appeals conceded 
that he had exposed serious misconduct, but emphasized his failure to 
recite with sufficient specificity how the employer had violated specific 
statutes. Plaintiff pointed to a Maryland statute making it a misdemeanor 
to fraudulently misrepresent the affairs, assets or liabilities of a corpora-
tion, "with a view either to enhance or depress the market value of the 
shares therein, or the value of its corporate obligations, or in any other 
manner to accomplish any fraud thereby .... " 21 The court rejected 
this statute as a basis for plaintiff's cause of action because plain-
tiff had not alleged that defendant's activities were intended to 
manipulate the value of the corporation's stock or obligations. 22 
The most protective view of unjust discharge allows the judiciary 
to go beyond the legislature and apply its own notion of public policy. 
The Illinois Supreme Court took this approach in Palmateer v. Inter-
national Harvester Co. 23 The plaintiff was discharged for reporting 
a fellow employee's criminal activity to local law enforcement authorities 
and for agreeing to assist in the subsequent investigation and trial. 
Although the court could have relied on the Criminal Code for a legis-
lative declaration of public policy, it went further and defined public 
policy as "what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the 
State collectively."24 It recognized judicial decisions as a source of public 
policy and declared that such policy favors citizen crime fighters. 25 Ac-
cordingly, it afforded Palmateer a cause of action. 
To reconcile these divergent approaches to the tort of abusive 
discharge, it is necessary to examine the origins of the tort. The cause 
19. Id. at 276. 
20. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). 
21. Id. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471 (quoting Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 174 (1976)). 
22. Id. The court also rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that the commercial bribes and false 
reports violated state and federal antitrust laws on similar grounds of insufficient specificity. 
Id. at 46, 432 A.2d at 472-73. 
23. 85 Jll. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). 
24. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878. 
25. Id. at 132-33, 421 N.E.2d at 880. 
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of action in tort for abusive discharge was initially advocated by Pro-
fessor Lawrence Blades. 26 In Blades's view, the purpose of the tort 
was to protect employee freedom of action from the employer's ab-
solute power over the employee's job security where the exercise of 
that power was _!lot legitimately related to the employee's job. 2 ' As 
proposed by Professor Blades, the tort was not limited to discharges 
that violated clear mandates of public policy, but included any attempt 
to intimidate or coerce an employee in a manner bearing no reasonable 
relationship to the job. 28 Although Blades is frequently cited in abusive 
discharge cases, his article provides neither the rationale nor the 
theoretical foundation for the tort that has been developed by the courts. 
Instead, the tort of abusive discharge recognized by the courts is 
predicated on arguments predating those contained in the Blades article. 
In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 29 the plain-
tiff had been discharged because of his refusal to perjure himself before 
a state legislative committee. Without citing supportive authority, the 
California Court of Appeals asserted that the contractual right to 
discharge an employee could be limited by considerations of public 
policy. 30 It noted that the solicitation of perjury was a crime, and that 
the threat of criminal prosecution usually would deter such conduct; 
however, it also sought to harmonize the civil law of employment at 
will with the policy against perjury expressed in the criminal law. It 
therefore curtailed the employer's otherwise absolute right to discharge 
at will where the reason for the discharge was the employee's refusal 
to commit perjury. 31 
Similarly, in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 32 the next case 
recognizing the tort of abusive discharge, the Indiana Supreme Court 
held that an employer's right to discharge at will must be limited where 
the discharge was in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. 
To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would completely emasculate 
the statutory workers' compensation scheme. 33 
The actual basis for the tort of abusive discharge as developed by 
the courts is therefore not the employee's right to freedom of action, 
as Blades advocated, but rather a perceived need to restrain otherwise 
unlimited employer power, where the exercise of such power poses a 
26. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise 
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967). 
27. Id. at 1405-06. 
28. Id. at 1413. 
29. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
30. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. Notably, the court did cite authority for the proposition that 
the right to _discharge could be limited by statute. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). 
33. Id. at 251-52, 297 N.E.2d at 427. 
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substantial threat to the public welfare. Decisions recognizing the tort 
but refusing to apply it to protect discharged whistleblowers reason 
that a discharge has not violated public policy if the whistleblower 
neither exercised a statutory right nor refused to breach a statutory 
duty. When viewed in light of the origins of the tort, such decisions 
clearly are incorrect. The societal harm resulting from the discharge 
of an employee who works internally to correct statutory violations 
or who reports such violations to appropriate authorities is as substan-
tial as the harm resulting from the discharge of an employee who refuses 
to commit the violation. 34 The absence of a statutory duty to report 
the violation, then, does not justify the refusal to protect the 
whistle blower. 3 5 
Although not insisting that the employee be under a statutory duty 
to report employer violations, the more protective jurisdictions do re-
quire that the conduct challenged by the employee actually violate a 
statute. 36 Thus, an employee who reports activities such as the marketing 
of defective products or the receipt of bribes and kickbacks which are 
34. For example, in Michigan when the Michigan Chemical Company accidentally shipped 
PBB instead of feed supplement to Michigan Farm Bureau Services, which accidentially mixed 
it with animal feed, employees aware of the error were warned by their supervisors not to report 
it if they wished to keep their jobs. Consequently, PBB worked its way into the state's food 
supply and ultimately contaminated most persons in the state. The PBB incident was a major 
reason for the enactment of Michigan's Whistleblower Protection Act. Westin, Michigan's Law 
to Protect the Whistle Blowers, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1981, at 18, col. 3. 
35. The anomaly of the contrary position can be clearly seen in Michigan where an employee 
fired for refusing to make misrepresentations to a government agency is protected, but one fired 
for trying to prevent misrepresentations by others is not protected. Compare Suchodolski v. 
Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982) with Trombetta v. Detroit, 
Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978). 
These jurisdictions probably refuse to expand the tort to protect whistleblowers because they 
fear that such expansion could lead to runaway litigation that would eventually eliminate manage-
ment's right to hire and fire. As one jurist cautioned: 
By departing from the general rule that an at-will employment is terminable at the discre-
tion of the employer, the courts are attempting to give recognition to the desire and 
expectation of an employee in continued employment. In doing so, however, the courts 
should not concentrate solely on promoting the employee's expectations. The courts 
must recognize that the allowance of a tort action for retaliatory discharge is a depar-
ture from, and an exception to, the general rule. The legitimate interest of the employer 
in guiding the policies and destiny of his operation cannot be ignored. The new tort 
for retaliatory discharge is in its infancy. In nurturing and shaping this remedy, courts 
must balance the interests of employee and employer with the hope of fashioning a 
remedy that will accomodate the legitimate expectations of both. In the process of emerg-
ing from the harshness of the former rule, we must guard against swinging the pen-
dulum to the opposite extreme. · 
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 142-43, 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 (1981) 
(Ryan, J ., dissenting). 
The ultimate fear is that "an employer may justly discharge an employee only at the risk 
of being compelled to defend a suit for retaliatory discharge." Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 
Ill. App. 3d 994, 998-99, 411 N .E.2d 50, 54 (1980) (emphasis in original). 
36. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
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generally considered to be improper, but which may not violate a specific 
statute, may find himself unprotected. Most employees know only that 
what their employers are doing is wrong. They are not sufficiently 
familiar with the intricacies of statutory and administrative law to assess 
what violations, if any, have occurred. Even the most sophisticated 
employee will frequently be unable to predict with certainty a statute's 
ultimate interpretation. 37 
Thus, even in the more protective jurisdictions protection is inade-
quate. A whistleblower can only be sure that a court might protect 
him against discharge. He cannot predict in a given case whether such 
protection is likely. The whistle blower must expect employer retalia-
tion and weigh the consequences in deciding whether to act; 38 one of 
the factors he must consider is whether the legal system will provide 
protection from retaliation. Thus, any standard of whistleblower pro-
tection must offer the employee a considerable measure of predictability. 
Unfortunately, the only alternative judicial formulation of when a 
discharge violates public policy is Palmateer's characterization of public 
policy as ''what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the 
State collectively.'' 39 This definition is so broad as to afford little pre-
dictability. Indeed it is probably less capable of guiding conduct than 
37. The problem is well illustrated by comparing two cases. In Adler v. American Standard 
Co., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), the plaintiff was discharged for reporting to the employer's 
headquarters that his supervisors were falsifying numerous corporate reports and paying com-
mercial bribes. The court, however, stressed that to be protected, the whistleblowing must con-
cern activity that clearly violated a public policy expressed by statute. The employee could not 
prove a specific statutory violation; therefore, no cause for action for abusive discharge would 
lie. On the other hand, in Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 
(1982), plaintiff, a pharmacist, was fired after insisting that defendant keep the pharmacy sec-
tion of its grocery store open and under the supervision of a licensed pharmacist whenever the 
store was open. Although the New Jersey statute governing the practice of pharmacy did not 
specifically require that the pharmacy section be open whenever the rest of the store was open, 
the court concluded that the pharmacist had acted to prevent what he thought was a statutory 
violation, and held that his discharge contravened public policy. 
38. The classic response to the whistleblowing employee - the ad hominem defense 
- is to divert attention from the disclosure to the discloser by attacking her motiva-
tion. This tactic transforms the problem into a mere "personality conflict," which is 
comparatively easier for management to deal with. In fact, after a study of a large 
number of government whistleblowers, one congressional report concluded that regardless 
of the nature or validity of the issue involved in the original allegation, the major response 
of the bureaucracy is directed to the employee who came forward and not to the problem. 
Raven-Hansen, Dos and Don'ts for Whistleblowers: Planning for Trouble, TECH. REv., May 
1980, at 34, 41. 
39. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981). The Palmateer court appears to have 
borrowed this definition of public policy from Justice Barry's dissent in the decision below. See 
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 54, 406 N.E.2d 595, 599 (1980) 
(Barry, J., dissenting). Significantly, though, neither party had advocated so amorphous a stan-
dard. Appellate Palmateer had urged only that the court "establish guidelines ... in order that 
a balance might be maintained between the unfettered exercise of business judgment and the 
protection of valid public interest .... " Reply Brief of Appellant at 11, Palmateer v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). 
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the standard which limits protection to the reporting of statutory viola-
tions. Employers are left not knowing when they can legally discharge 
an employee, while employees are left not knowing when their whistle-
blowing will be protected and when they will be acting at their peril. 
Besides lacking predictablility, the common law standards that have 
developed have also lacked sufficient flexibility to accomodate 
whistleblowers occupying different positions with different respon-
sibilities to their employers. Commentators have suggested that pro-
fessional employees, in particular, are entitled to protection from 
discharge where their actions conform to professional ethical standards. 40 
Courts, however, are divided over whether a code of professional ethics 
is a sufficient expression of public policy to support an action for abusive 
discharge. 41 
Divergent judicial views also exist concerning the relevance of the 
whistleblower's position with the employer. One court, in protecting 
a whistleblower, emphasized the employee's authority and responsibility 
over the type of actions on which he blew the whistle, 42 yet another 
court, in denying a whistleblower protection, noted that the employee 
lacked such authority or responsibility. 43 A third court has maintained 
that employers must have wide latitude in dealing with upper level 
managers44 ~ a decision which suggests that employers may impose 
greater requirements of loyalty on such individuals than on line 
employees. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, courts have failed to develop 
a common standard for evaluating whistleblower conduct that is both 
flexible and predictable. Flexibility has generally characterized arbitration 
decisions interpreting collective bargaining agreements and some com-
mentators have called for statutory reform of the common law modeled 
on the just cause and arbitration provisions of collective bargaining 
agreements. 45 The following section, however, demonstrates that ar-
40. See, e.g., Feliu, Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal For 
Acts Within A Professional Code Of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149 (1980); Note, 
A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or 
/1/egal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REv. 805 (1980). Cf. Ed-
sall, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, 188 Sc1. 687, 688 (1975) ("Scientists possess no rights 
beyond those of other citizens except those necessary to fulfill the responsibilities arising from 
their special knowledge, and from the insight arising from that knowledge."). 
41. Compare Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980) 
and Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 156-57, 443 A.2d 728, 730-31 (1982) 
(both recognizing in dictum that in appropriate circumstances a code of professional ethics can 
be a source of public policy) with Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692 
696, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (rejecting this proposition). 
42. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385, 388 (1980). 
43. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 181, 319 A.2d 174, 178-79 (1974). 
44. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (8th Cir. 1976). 
45. See, e.g., Steiber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal, INDUS. REL. NEWSLETTER, Fall 
1978, at 4; Summers, supra note 6, at 519-31._ 
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bitrators also have failed to develop adequate standards for dealing 
with whistleblowers. 
B. Collective Bargaining Agreements and Arbitration 
Most collective bargaining agreements require that the employer have 
just cause to discharge covered employees. 46 Where such a provision 
is not explicit, arbitrators often imply it. 47 Commentators have assumed 
that such provisions include substantial protection for whistleblowers; 48 
review of the relevant arbitration decisions, however, suggests that such 
an assumption is faulty. 
An employer who discharges a whistleblower invariably will defend 
the discharge on grounds of employee disloyalty. The concept of em-
ployee loyalty implicates the voluntary acceptance of a relationship in-
volving an "identity of interests and a support of common effort and 
continued effectiveness." 49 Loyalty requires that an employee promote 
the welfare of the business and· act in the best interests of the employer. 
For example, an employee is disloyal when he places himself in a posi-
tion that may have an adverse economic impact on the employer. Thus, 
an employee who moonlights for a competitor50 or has an interest in 
a competitor5 1 is considered disloyal. Disloyalty also exists where an 
employee's actions can reasonably be expected to have an adverse im-
pact on customer confidence in the employer, 52 or the employer's public 
image or reputation. 53 Arbitrators recognize, however, that the duty 
of loyalty must be tempered by a rule of reason. An employee's obliga-
tions to his employer must be balanced with his rights as a private 
citizen. 54 
Appalachian Power Co. 55 illustrates the difficulties encountered in 
striking this balance. While collecting information to complete a report 
46. A Bureau of National Affairs Survey reveals that 80% of collective bargaining agreements 
contain provisions regarding discharge for "just cause." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIA-
TIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1 (1978). 
47. See, e.g., Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 300-01 (1955) (Boles, Arb.). 
48. See, e.g., Walters, Your Employees' Right to Blow the Whistle, 53 HARV. Bus. REv. 
July-Aug. 1975, at 34. Summers appears to make a similar assumption, as he cites a whistleblower 
case, Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), as an example of 
why statutory just cause protection from discharge is needed. Summers. suvra note 6. at 481-82. 
49. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 453, 464 (1967) (Jones, Arb.). 
50. Pipe Coupling Mfrs., 1966-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8598 (McCoy, Arb.). 
51. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1258 (1971) (Larson, Arb.); see also 
Mechanical Handling Systems, Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 401 (1956) (Keller, Arb.). 
52. Anthony Co., 1969-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8699 (Cohen, Arb.). 
53. NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Thiokol Chem. Corp., 
1969-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8705 (Williams, Arb.). 
54. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co., 1973-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8496 at 4841 
(McDermott, Arb.). 
55. Id. 
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on accidental damage to one of the company's poles, a company ser-
viceman spoke to city officials about the company's rate increase· re-
quest. The employee advised city officials that he believed the com-
pany was wasting money on unnecessary promotional activity and en-
couraged the city to oppose the rate petition pending before the Public 
Service Commission. In upholding the company's suspension of the 
employee, the arbitrator relied on the employee's clear identification 
as a company employee at the time he spoke with city officials, the 
inaccuracy of the information, and the confidential nature of the in-
formation to tip the balance in favor of the employer. 56 
Many arbitrators have agreed with employers that whistleblowing 
constitutes disloyalty and is therefore just cause for discharge or other 
discipline. They view the whistleblower's actions as harmful to the 
employer's reputation and disruptive of employee morale. Arbitrators 
have upheld discharges in part because they perceive the employee whc 
deliberately blows the whistle as impliedly assuming the risk of 
discharge. 57 These arbitrators have followed two approaches in sus-
taining whistleblower discharges. 
Some arbitrators appear to view whistleblowing as disloyalty per se. 
They take a hard line approach that you cannot ''bite the hand that 
feeds you, and insist on staying for future banquets. " 58 Herald-
Examiner59 exemplifies the harsh consequences of this per se approach. 
The employee, an editor of the Sunday magazine, objected when his 
superiors ordered that color reproductions of master paintings of 
Madonna and Child be airbrushed so they would not show genitalia. 
When his efforts to have the decision overruled failed, the editor, viewing 
the airbrushing as unethical, resigned, giving two weeks notice. He then 
sought employment with the Los Angeles Free Press and upon being 
asked, advised the Free Press of the reasons for his resignation. The 
Free Press used the information to satirize the Herald-Examiner. As 
a result, the editor was immediately fired, prior to the effective date 
of his resignation. 
The arbitrator upheld the discharge, finding that the editor's revela-
tions to the Free Press embarrassed his employer. Although the editor 
was merely explaining his reasons for seeking employment, not delib-
erately challenging his employer's conduct, the arbitrator concluded 
that the editor should have forseen that the Free Press might use the 
information as it did. A fortiori this arbitrator would have viewed in-
tentional whistleblowing as disloyalty per se. 
56. Id. 
57. R.P. Richards, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 412, 418 (1974) (Gentile, Arb.) ("When one 
appears before a public forum . . . then one must assume the responsibility for the words 
used .... "); Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 453, 465 (1967) (Jones, Arb.). 
58. Forest City Publishing Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 773, 783 (1972) (McCoy, Arb.). 
59. 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 453, 465 (1967) (Jones, Arb.). 
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Other arbitrators, though not ruling that whistleblowing is disloyal 
per se, have sustained discharges on the basis of such factors as the 
employee's bad faith or malicious motive, 60 his failure to resort first 
to internal channels, 61 the tone and visibility of the employee's 
statements, 62 and the statements' falsity. 63 These decisions place a heavy 
burden on the employee to consider the impact of his actions on the 
employer, the truth of his beliefs, and the methods by which he chooses 
to blow the whistle before he acts. 
Davenport Good Samaritan Center6 4 and R.P. Richards, Inc. 65 il-
lustrate this latter approach. In Davenport, a dietary aide was suspended 
because she reported her nursing home employer to state health author-
ities. The employee filed the report after she showed her supervisor 
a loaf of bread which had been partially eaten by a rodent. The super-
visor told her to cut off the bad part and use the rest. A state inspec-
tion precipitated by the complaint found that the home had a rodent 
problem but was taking adequate measures to control it. The arbitrator 
upheld the suspension, finding that the complaint damaged the home's 
reputation and caused needless concern among the residents and em-
ployees. He chastised the whistleblower for not taking her concerns 
to the home's administrator before going public. 
In Richards, the employer, a plumbing contractor, had petitioned 
a public agency for permission to substitute plastic pipe for cast iron 
pipe in a construction project. The employee appeared at a public hear-
ing, identified himself as a private citizen, and opposed the variance, 
testifying, "the . . . District is a victim of a fraud if you approve 
this . . . . '' When the employee was discharged, the local press linked 
his discharge to his testimony. Even though the variance was ultimately 
granted, the arbitrator sustained the discharge, emphasizing the public 
visibility of the issue, the employer's vulnerability, the tone of the 
employee's statement, and the fact that the employee was linked pub-
lically to the employer even though he identified himself as a private 
citizen. 66 
60. See Kroger Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1980) (Doering, Arb.); Thiokol Chem. Corp., 
1969-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8705 (Williams, Arb.). 
61. See Davenport Good Samaritan Center, 1978-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8441 (Ross, 
Arb.); Factory Services, Inc., 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1088 (1978) (Fitch, Arb.). 
62. R.P. Richards, Inc., 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 412, 417-18 (1974) (Gentile, Arb.). 
63. Davenport Good Samaritan Center, 1978-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8441 (Ross, Arb.). 
64. Id. 
65. 63 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 412 (1974) (Gentile, Arb.). 
66. Arbitrators have often reinstated whistleblowers where their activities were directly related 
to their positions as union officials. See, e.g., City of Williamsport, 61 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 279 
(1973) (Loewenberg, Arb.); see also Sun Furniture Co., 1979-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8447 
(Ruben, Arb.) (employee reinstated despite disparaging employer to customer where real motive 
for discharge was employee's union activities). Cf. Hopwood Foods, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 
349 (1979) (Mullin, Arb.) (employee reinstated because his allegations of management incompetence 
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Recent cases reflect some moderation of the relatively hard line that 
arbitrators have taken toward whistleblowers. In Olympic Memorial 
Hospital, 67 three nurses were discharged for registering concerns over 
the competence of the Director of Nursing with her superiors. The 
employer contended that the charges proved to be false and that the 
complaints disrupted employee morale and interfered with the hospital's 
orderly operation. The arbitrator ordered the nurses reinstated. Find-
ing the alleged falsity of the complaints irrelevant, he emphasized the 
nurses' good faith and suggested that had the nurses remained silent, 
they would have compromised their responsibilities to their patients. 
Similarly, in Town of Plainville, 68 an arbitrator ordered a city 
employee reinstated following his discharge for writing an anonymous 
letter to a town councilman suggesting that a foreman had misap-
propriated town property. The charge turned out to be false but was 
made in good faith. The arbitrator set forth six factors to guide his 
decision: the significance of the activity exposed, the whistleblower's 
motives, the whistleblower's state of mind, the method used to blow 
the whistle, the harm to the employer, and the employee's right of 
free expression. 69 
Although both Olympic Memorial Hospital and Town of Plainville 
take a more tolerant view of whistleblowing, both cases protected 
employees who did not go public. Of perhaps greater significance is 
a recent decision in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upholding 
an employee's right to go public. In Jones Dairy Farm, 10 the arbitrator 
upheld a meat processor's rule prohibiting employees from reporting 
contamination problems to U.S.D.A. inspectors and requiring that the 
problems be reported to supervisors. He viewed the rule as a reasonable 
method of insuring that unsanitary conditions are brought to the at-
tention of management for correction. A federal district court, in an 
opinion affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, enjoined enforcement of this 
decision, holding that it contravened public policy because it prohibited 
employees from reporting violations to inspectors even if a serious prob-
lem remained uncorrected after being reported to management. 11 
The arbitrators' decisions in Olympic Memorial Hospital and Town 
of Plainville and the court's decision in Jones Dairy Farm, however, 
were made in his capacity as shareholder rather than employee). Arbitrators have also relied 
on whistleblower good faith and the absence of damage to the employer to reduce, Zellerbach 
Paper Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 868 (1980) (Gentile, Arb.), or overturn, Northern Indiana Public 
Serv. Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 201 (1977) (Sembower, Arb.), the discharge. 
67. 1981-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8059 (1980) (Sinclitico, Arb.). 
68. 77 Lab. Arb. Awards (BNA) 161 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.). 
69. 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 167-71. 
70. 1979-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8310 (Maslanka, Arb.). 
71. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local P-1236 v. Jones Dairy Farm, 519 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. 
Wis. 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982). 
292 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 16:2 
are relatively unique among published arbitration decisions. The 
divergent approaches taken by arbitrators in evaluating whistleblower 
discharges further underscores the need for a general standard of 
whistleblower protection. 
C. Statutory Protection 
In some circumstances, a whistleblower may be protected by the an-
tiretaliation provision of one of a variety of statutes. Such provisions 
are primarily found in federal statutes regulating employment, and pro-
hibit retaliation against individuals exercising rights conferred by the 
statutes. 72 
1. Federal civil rights legislation- The virtually identical antiretalia-
tion provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VIl") 73 
72. Antiretaliation provisions are also found in the following non-employment statutes: Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1367 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1976); Solid Waste Disposal 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (Supp. I 1977); and Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1976). They first appeared in 1972 in amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act so that "employees and union officials could 
help assure that employers do not contribute to the degradation of our environment." S. REP. 
No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 3668, 3748. 
By 1976 antiretaliation provisions in federal environmental legislation were considered "standard 
employee protection." H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 6238, 6245. Employees who believe they are the victims of retaliation must 
file complaints with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. The complaints 
are investigated and if found meritorious are set for hearing before an administrative law judge; 
complaints found lacking in merit are dismissed unless the complainant requests a hearing. 29 
C.F.R. § 24.4(2)(i) (1982). Following the hearing, the administrative law judge issues a recom-
mendation, with the final order coming from the Secretary of Labor. 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(a) (1982). 
The Secretary's decision is reviewable in the circuit courts of appeals subject to the substantial 
evidence standard. See Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp. v. Marshall, 629 F.2d 563, 566 (8th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Ellis Fischel State Cancer Hosp. v. Donovan, 450 U.S. 1040 
(1981). 
The availability of this statutory protection is tempered by an unusually short period of limita-
tions. All complaints must be filed within 30 days following the alleged act of retaliation. The 
danger that a victim of employer retaliation will lose his remedy because of late filing is further 
enhanced by the requirement that the filing be made with the Labor Department rather than 
the agency enforcing the environmental statute of whose violation the employee initially com-
plained. See School Dist. v. Marshall, 657 F.2d, 16, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Greenwald 
v. City of North Miami Beach, 587 F.2d 779, 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826 (1979). 
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. VI 1980). Section 704(a) provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or 
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retrain-
ing, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or 
for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for 
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment prac-
tice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976). 
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and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")74 provide 
the broadest protection for the whistleblower. Prohibited retaliation is 
not limited to discharge, but encompasses all actions inconsistent with 
the employer's usual procedures75 as well as reprisals outside the scope 
of the employment relationship such as the filing of a retalitory lawsuit. 76 
Under these statutes, protection continues after the employment rela-
tionship has ended. Thus, a former employer may not retaliate by 
withholding reference letters or supplying negative references, 77 and a 
subsequent employer may not consider an employee's assertion of Title 
VII or ADEA rights against a prior employer in deciding whether to hire 
the employee. 78 
Two types of conduct are explicitly protected by these statutes: par-
ticipation in a statutory enforcement proceeding and opposition to 
employer practices violating the statutes. Participation has been broadly 
construed to protect the filing of employment discrimination charges 
with state agencies, 79 assisting others in filing charges, 80 and refusing 
to testify in favor of a party. 8 ' Efforts to gather evidence are also pro-
tected. For example, in United States v. City of Milwaukee, 82 the court 
enjoined enforcement of a city police department rule forbidding of-
ficers from discussing department business with persons outside the 
department to the extent that the rule was used to prohibit employees 
from cooperating with federal civil rights investigators. 
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (antiretaliation provision at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(d) (1976)). 
75. Illegal retaliation has taken several forms, including suspension, see Hearth v. Metropolitan 
Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn, 1977); demotion, see Smith v. Columbus 
Metropolitan Housing Auth., 443 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Ohio 1977); denial of positions to which 
employee was entitled by virtue of seniority, see Berio v. EEOC, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
1 8847 (D.D.C. 1979); Hackley v. Cleland, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 11,585 (D.D.C. 1977); 
refusal to provide work instructions, see Robinson v. Midenhorf, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 
1 11,415 (D.D.C. 1976); extension of probationary period, see Sherkow v. Department of Public 
Instruc., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 8553 (W.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 
as to remedy, 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980); transfer to an undesirable position, see Hatton v. 
Ford Motor Co., 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 132,038 (E.D. Mich. 1981); and refusal to provide 
a customary commendation, see EEOC Recommendation No. 74-15 (Aug. 7, 1973). 
76. See EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Va. 1980), 652 
F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1981). 
77. See Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978). 
78. In Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972), an employer refused 
to hire an applicant who had filed Title VII charges against his former employer. The prospec-
tive employer claimed that the applicant was seeking reinstatement with his former employer, 
might return to work for his former employer in the near future, and therefore was unacceptable 
for the position that was available. The court held the refusal to hire was illegal retaliation. 
79. See, e.g., Kralowec v. Prince George's County, 503 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd 
mem., 679 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1982); Hayden v. Chrysler Corp., 486 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Mich. 
1980); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afj'd mem., 559 
F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). 
80. See Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1979). 
81. See Smith v. Columbus Metropolitan Housing Auth., 443 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Ohio 1977). 
82. 390 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 
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An employee who files descrimination charges is protected against 
retaliation even if the charges are false and intentionally malicious. 
In Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 83 the court reasoned that 
because the filing of charges by employees was essential to the enforce-
ment process, the need for protection against retaliation outweighed 
the employer's interest in using the power to discharge as a means of 
protecting itself from maliciously libelous employee statements. 84 Similar 
concerns have prompted other courts to bar employer tort actions for 
damages resulting from maliciously false charges. 85 
Protection is also afforded if an employee opposes employer prac- . 
tices that the employee believes are discriminatory. Protected opposi-
tion includes refusing to carry out illegal instructions, 86 alerting a govern-
ment agency with whom the employer deals to the employer's illegal 
practices, 87 and working within the employer's internal structure to 
eliminate the employer's illegal practices. 88 The employer's practices 
need not actually violate the civil rights laws; so long as the employee 
acts on a good faith belief that illegal conduct exists he is protected 
from retaliation. 89 
Not all employee action in opposition to discrimination, however, 
is covered by these antiretaliation provisions. Opposition must be aimed 
at the employer's activities rather than at the discriminatory conduct 
of fellow employees. 90 The opposition must be lawful and reasonable. 
For example, employers may discipline or discharge an employee who 
copies the employer's confidential documents even though the copies 
are to be used in opposing the employer's discriminatory practices. 91 
Employees' statutory rights to oppose discrimination are not to be con-
strued as a general license to be insubordinate. 92 
The nature of an employee's job may influence the scope of his right 
to oppose discriminatory employment practices. For example, in cer-
tain circumstances the method of opposition may hinder the employee's 
83. 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 415 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1969). 
84. This broad interpretation of antiretaliation provisions is not available under other federal 
statutes. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (discussing National Labor Relations Act). 
85. See EEOC v. Virginia Carolina Veneer Corp., 495 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Va. 1980); Cooper 
v. Pie-Walsh Freight Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 8994 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
86. See Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971). 
87. See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978); Hicks v. ABT 
Associates, 572 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1978). 
88. See Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980). 
89. See id.; see also Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1978). 
90. See Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding employer may fire employee 
who forced a co-worker to apologize to a black for a racial slur). 
91. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980); 
see also Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972) (illegal "stall-in"), 
vacated on other grounds, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); King v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 476 F. Supp. 
495 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (strike in breach of no-strike clause in collective bargaining agreement). 
92. See Monteiro v. Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1980). 
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ability to carry out responsibilities peculiar to his position. 93 Thus, an 
equal employment opportunity manager may be fired for filing com-
plaints or soliciting others to file complaints with civil rights enforcement 
agencies, because such activities compromise the manager's duty to 
represent fully the employer's interests in its dealings with those 
agencies. 94 
2. Federal labor laws- Other federal statutes furnish a different 
measure of protection from retaliation. 
a. The National Labor Relations Act- The National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA") shields from retaliation any "employee" who 
"has filed charges or .given testimony" in proceedings under the 
NLRA. 95 In contrast with Title VII and the ADEA, though, it does 
not accord general protection to employees opposing illegal employer 
practices; rather, it covers only participation in NLRA proceedings. 96 
Moreover, the NLRA's protections only expressly apply to "employees," 
which the statute defines to exclude supervisors; 97 National Labor Rela-
tions Board ("NLRB") decisions have further limited the term to ex-
clude managerial employees98 and students employed by their educa-
tional institutions. 99 The degree of protection, if any, afforded such 
employees who participate in NLRA proceedings is the subject of con-
siderable controversy. Although most of the litigation has involved 
retaliation against supervisors, the same issues arise whether the 
employee is a supervisor or some other individual excluded from the 
statutory definition of "employee." 
Courts generally agree that an employer may not retaliate against 
93. Rosser v. Laborers' lnt'I Union of North America, Local 438, 616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 
1980) (legal for union to fire its dues posting clerk for political disloyalty after she unsuccessfully 
ran against her direct supervisor as a means of opposing discriminatory practices), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 886 (1980); Novotny v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Pa. 
1982) (legal to fire corporation secretary where he sided with employees in their dispute with 
corporation president by confronting the president in the presence of the employees); Doe v. 
AFL-CIO, 405 F. Supp 389 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (legal for union to fire organizer who tells black 
workers that some unions are insensitive to blacks' needs and that certain uni_on leaders lack 
social awareness), aff'd mem., 537 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977). 
94. See Smith v. Singer Co., 650 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 
628 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976) (antiretaliation provision at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976)). 
96. Id. In certain instances, however, protection may be available under sections S(a)(l) and 
8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l)(a)(3) (1976). See Morris, The Developing Labor 
Law -134, 1971 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. REL. LAW (BNA). 
97. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Also excluded are agricultural laborers, domestics, individuals 
employed by their parents or spouses, independent contractors, or persons employed by employers 
not subject to the Act. 
98. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 
416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
99. See San Francisco Art Inst., 226 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1976); Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 
223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976). See generally Malin, Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 
69 Kv. L.J. I (1980). 
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a supervisor who testifies 100 or gives a sworn statement 101 in an NLRA 
proceeding involving employees covered by the Act. Three reasons have 
been advanced in favor of this result. First, prohibiting retaliation against 
supervisor testimony protects the NLRB's sources of information and 
thereby assures effective administration of the NLRA. 102 Second, the 
right to have witnesses testify at NLRB proceedings is embodied within 
the NLRA's guaranty to covered employees of the right to engage in 
concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. 103 Thus, although 
the supervisor may lack an independent right to testify, his testimony 
must be protected to protect the rights of nonsupervisory employees. 10• 
Third, in certain circumstances nonsupervisory employees may inter-
pret retaliation against a supervisor as part of a general antiunion cam-
paign, and consequently may forego exercising their NLRA rights. 105 
Accordingly, courts have held that retaliation against such supervisor 
testimony violates section 8(a)(4)'s prohibition against retaliation 106 or 
section 8(a)(l)'s general prohibition against employer interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employees exercising their statutory rights. 101 
The NLRB has extended supervisor protection beyond the limited 
degree accepted by the courts. In General Nutrition Center108 the 
employer discharged a supervisor who led a group of employees to 
the NLRB's regional office and assisted them in filing an unfair labor 
practice charge. Relying on cases protecting supervisor testimony, the 
Board held that the discharge violated sections 8(a)(4) and 8(a)(l). 109 
In General Services, Inc., 110 the Board went a step further and barred 
retaliation against a supervisor who filed an unsuccessful unfair labor 
practice charge on his own behalf, rather than on the behalf of the 
100. See Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1966); King Radio Corp. 
v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 
1962); NLRB v. Better Monkey Grip Co., 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), enforcing 115 N.L.R.B. 1170, 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 864 (1957). 
IOI. See NLRB v. Electro Motive Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Southland 
Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1968). 
102. See NLRB v. Electro Motive Mfg. Co., 389 F.2d 61, 62 (4th Cir.1968); Oil City Brass 
Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466, 471 (5th Cir. 1966). 
103. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1976). 
104. See King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14, 22 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Southland 
Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1968); Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466, 
471 (5th Cir. I 966). 
105. See King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14, 22 (10th Cir. 1968). 
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976). See Oil City Brass Works v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 466 (5th 
Cir. 1966). 
107. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976). See King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 
1968); NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 310 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1962). 
108. 221 N.L.R.B. 850 (1975). 
109. Id. at 858. If this view is ultimately accepted by the courts of appeals, the result may 
be somewhat greater protection under the NLRA than under Title VII and the ADEA. See supra 
notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
110. 229 N.L.R.B. 940 (1977), enforcement denied, 515 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978). 
WINTER 1983) Protecting the Whistleblower 297 
nonsupervisory employees. In its prior cases, the supervisor was pro-
tected in order to safeguard the rights of employees covered under the 
NLRA. In this case, however, no such employees were involved. 111 The 
Board, reasoning that enforcement of the NLRA depended upon all 
individuals having free and uncoerced access to it, concluded that ab-
sent specific contrary congressional directives, the term "employee" 
as used in section 8(a)(4) should be interpreted to include supervisors 
who file unfair labor practice charges. 112 In the Board's view, the 
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act's exclusion of supervisors 
from the general definition of employee revealed nothing suggesting 
a congressional intent to limit section 8(a)(4)'s coverage to nonsuper-
visory employees. 113 The Board reiterated this broad interpretaion of 
section 8(a)(4) in Hi-Craft Clothing Co. 114 
The Court of Appeals refused, however, to enforce the Board's orders 
in both General Services 115 and Hi-Craft 116 • The court in Hi-Craft 
grounded its denial of enforcement on the plain arid unambiguous ex-
clusion of supervisors from the NLRA's definition of employee and 
on the lack of any effect of the retaliation on the interests of non-
supervisory employees. 111 
The courts' exclusion of supervisors from the protections of Section 
8(a)(4) except where the supervisor testifies in proceedings involving 
the rights of nonsupervisory employees may well comport with the 
overall statutory scheme of the NLRA. 118 This exclusion underscores 
the need for an independent source of whistleblower protection. For 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 942. 
113. Id. 
114. 251 N.L.R.B. 1310 (1980), enforcement denied, 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981). Recently, 
the Board has retreated in protecting supervisors. See Parker-Robb Chevrolet, 262 NLRB No. 
58, 1982 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 19,087 (1982). Whether this retreat will affect section 8(a)(4) re-
mains to be seen. 
115. 575 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978). 
116. 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981). 
117. Id. at 918. 
118. Excluding supervisors from the protection of section 8(a)(4) in such cases, however, 
has two adverse effects. First, it forces the employee whose supervisory status is in doubt to 
assume the risk that he will be held to be a supervisor and left unprotected. Such forced assump-
tion of the risk, however, already occurs under section 8(a)(3) when the individual engages in 
union acitivity. If he is found to be a supervisor he may be lawfully discharged, but if he is 
found to be an employee, his union activity is protected. Second, retaliation against the super-
visor may instill fear in employees covered by the NLRA that they too may be subjected to 
retaliation. Congress chose to ignore the potential chilling effects of such fears on rank and 
file employees when it decided to exclude supervisors from coverage of the NLRA. See Hi-Craft 
Clothing Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1310, 1312-13 (1980) (Truesdale, Member, dissenting), enforcement 
denied, 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981). An interesting issue, beyond the scope of this Article, is 
whether a state law providing general whistleblower protection would be preempted by the NLRA 
when applied to supervisors. Cf. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 
(1974) (holding that the NLRA preempts state law creating remedy for supervisors discharged 
on account of labor union membership). 
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example, suppose that an employee whose supervisory status is in doubt 
is discharged for belonging to a labor organization. If the employee 
is found to be a supervisor, the discharge is lawful, but if the employee 
is found to be nonsupervisory and thus protected by the NLRA, the 
discharge violates Section 8(a)(3)'s prohibition of discrimination against 
employees who engage in protected concerted activity. 119 Suppose fur-
ther that another employee who is clearly supervisory is aware of in-
formation related to the first employee's charge, and offers such in-
formation to an NLRB investigator or testifies at an unfair labor practice 
proceeding and is then discharged in retaliation. If the first employee 
is held to be nonsupervisory, the supervisor will be protected because 
the discharge interferes with the first employee's exercise of statutory 
rights. If, however, the first employee is held also to be a supervisor, 
the second supervisor's discharge will be legal because it is related to 
protected activity of covered employees. Thus, whether the supervisor 
is protected turns entirely on the status ultimately accorded the first 
employee. In these circumstances the supervisor is in a position com-
parable to that of the whistleblower in a jurisdiction that limits com-
mon law protection to the reporting of statutory violations. 120 The super-
visor cannot predict with reasonable certainty whether he will be pro-
tected from discharge nor effectively weigh the personal consequences 
of cooperating with the NLRB. 
In cases where section 8(a)(4) applies, it is interpreted broadly. Not 
only discharge, but all other forms of retaliation are prohibited. 121 
Moreover, applicants for employment, 122 former employees, 121 and em-
I I 9. Section 8(a)(3) provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard 
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage 
or discourage membership in any labor organization. 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). 
120. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The issue of whether particular employees 
are supervisors has generated considerable litigation. See generally, Finkin, The Supervisory Status 
of Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 805 (1977); Comment, The Status of Super-
visors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 35 LA. L. REV. 800 (1975). 
121. See, e.g., Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Center v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(denying part-time physician employees full-time status); Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union 
669 v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (refusing to hire "employees" who had been pro-
mised jobs on worksite); Wilson v. Whitehall Packing Co., 108 L.R.R.M. 2165 (BNA) (W.D. 
Wis. 1980) (filing lawsuit against employee); Riley-Beaird, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1982) (suspend-
ing employees); Welfare, Pension and Vacation Funds, 256 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1981) (promulgating 
more stringent workplace rules); Art Steel of Cal., Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 816 (1981) (issuing warn-
ings to employees); Continental Dist. Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 654 (1981) (prohibiting employees from 
speaking to co-workers); Pan-Abode, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 313 (1976) (refusing to increase wages); 
Florida Drum Co., Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 604 (1974) (failing to reinstate unlawfully discharged 
employee); Telecom, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 104 (1966) (refusing to rehire lawfully terminated 
employees). 
123. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 79 NLRB 939 (1948), enforced, 180 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1950). 
WINTER 1983] Protecting the Whistleblower 299 
ployees of other employers, 124 as well as current employees, have been 
held entitled to protection. An employee is protected even though his 
employer does not gross a sufficient dollar. volume of business to be 
generally subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction. 125 Although the statute 
only literally embraces employees who file charges or testify, it has 
been interpreted to cover employees on whose behalf a union has filed 
charges, 126 employees present at representation proceedings, 121 employees 
who threaten to file charges, 128 and employees whom the employer er-
roneously believes to have filed charges. 129 Similarly protected are 
employees who, although they do not actually testify in formal pro-
ceedings, provide sworn statements to NLRB investigators, 130 and those 
who refuse to give false or misleading testimony. 131 
The broad privilege given to charges filed under Title VII and the 
ADEA132 has not, however, been extended under Section 8(a)(4). Al-
though the employer may not retaliate against an employee merely 
because the employee's charge is not upheld, 133 deliberately false and 
malicious charges are not protected from retaliation 134 or subsequent 
lawsuit. 135 Moreover, the employer may use information obtained in 
an NLRB proceeding as a basis for disciplinary action. 136 
b. The Fair Labor Standards Act- A second major piece of federal 
employment legislation containing an antiretaliation provision is the 
124. Joseph Nemeth, 222 N.L.R.B. 664 (1976); Lamar Cremery Co., I 15 N.L.R.B. 1113 
(1956), enforced, 246 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1957). 
125. See Pedersen v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956); Pickle Bill's, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 
413 (1976). 
126. See Lenox Hill Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1976); Briggs Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 569 
(1947). 
127. See Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 1981 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 117,919 
(1981), enforcement denied, 677 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1982); E.H. Ltd., 227 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1977), 
enforcement denied sub nom. Service Employees Int'! Union v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1979). 
128. See Glenside Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. 62 (1978) (finding that the employer unlawfully 
discharged the employee for filing an unfair labor practice charge); see also NLRB v. Retail 
Store Employees Union Local 876, 570 F.2d 586, 591 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978) (noting that a discharge 
of an employee who threatens to file charges with the NLRB violates § 8(a)(4)), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 819 (1978). 
129. See Maple City Stamping Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 743 (1972). 
130. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972). 
131. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 876, 570 F.2d 586 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 819 (1978). 
132. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
133. See NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967); Acme Paper Box 
Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 240 (1973). 
134. See NLRB v. Brake Parts Co., 447 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1971); Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964). 
135. See Power ~ystems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979). 
136. See Oakland Press Co., 260 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 1982 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 118,886 (1982) 
(employee who filed charge while on sick leave was discharged for dishonesty and abusing sick 
leave); Fairmont Creamery Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1380, 1410-12 (1947), enforced, 169 F.2d 169 (10th 
Cir. 1948) (employee discharged after testifying that he advised co-employee that employer was 
testing co-employee for dishonesty). 
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Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 137 The FLSA protects all per-
sons, not just employees, from retaliation. 138 As with the NLRA, its 
antiretaliation provision is applicable whether or not the employer is 
otherwise subject to FLSA jurisdiction. 139 The FLSA protects com-
plaints to the employer about alleged violations, 140 refusals to waive 
FLSA rights, 141 filings of private suits to enforce the FLSA, 142 threats 
to file suit or initiate an administrative complaint, 143 testimony, 144 and 
refusals to give false testimony. 145 The employee does not assume the 
risk that the complaint ultimately will be found lacking in merit; in-
deed, he is protected from reprisal as long as he entertains an objec-
tively reasonable, good faith belief that the employer is violating the 
Act. 146 Thus, the FLSA protection is somewhat broader than NLRA 
protection, at least with respect to supervisors acting in good faith. 147 
As with other statutes, however, the employee's actions must be 
reasonable and legal. Actions such as misappropriating employer records 
are not protected, even though the records are to be used in an enforce-
ment proceeding. 148 
3. The Occupational Safety and Health Act- The most recent 
federal employment legislation to incorporate an antiretaliation provi-
sion is the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"). 149 It too 
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976). Section 15(a)(3) makes it unlwful "to discharge or in any 
other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint 
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has 
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding .... " Id. at 215(a)(3). 
138. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Seminole 
Distributors Inc., 23 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 174 (N.D. Fla. 1977). 
139. See Wirtz v. Ross Packaging Co., 367 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Equitable 
Co., 13 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 564 (D.N.J. 1958). 
140. See Goldberg v. Zenger, 15 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 237 (D. Utah 1961). 
141. See Dunlop v. South Glens Falls Lumber Co., 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 864 
(N.D.N.Y. 1976); Hodgson v. Vinger, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 78 (S.D. Fla. 1971). But 
see Wirtz v. C.H. Valentine Lumber Co., 236 F. Supp. 616 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (denying FLSA 
protection to a complaint filed by an employee where the employer had sufficient disciplinary 
cause to discharge the employee). 
142. See Marshall v. Mardels, Inc., 23 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). 
143. See Marshall v. Great Lakes Recreation Co., 25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 506 (W.D. 
Mich. 1981). 
144. See Wirtz v. Home News Publishing Co., 341 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
823 (1965). 
145. See Hodgson v. Hodges, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 155 (E.D. Cal. 1971). 
146. See Brennan v. Maxey's Yahama, Inc., 513 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1975). 
141. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
148. See Hodgson v. Texaco, Inc., 440 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1971); Walling v. Barnesville Farmers 
Elevator Co., 58 F. Supp. 821 · (D. Minn. 1945). 
149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976). Section ll(c)(l) provides: 
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because 
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any pro-
ceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any 
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has been broadly construed to encompass not only the filing of com-
plaints with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, but 
also complaints to the employer, 1 so complaints to other agencies 
regulating work place safety, 151 and retention of counsel to rectify un-
safe working conditions. 152 Of course, the employee must act reasonably 
and lawfully. 
In other respects, however, OSHA's antiretaliation provision has been 
read narrowly. 153 One court has refused to prohibit retaliation by persons 
other than the employee's employer, 154 though such an interpretation 
is inconsistent with decisions under Title VII, the ADEA, NLRA, and 
FLSA, and appears to ignore OSHA's broad language prohibiting "any 
person" from retaliating. Courts have also refused to protect employee 
safety complaints where such complaints have been found not to in-
volve rights expressly embodied within OSHA. 1 ss 
II. TOWARD GENERAL PROTECTION FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS 
A. The lnadequcies of a "Piecemeal" Statutory Approach 
Whistleblowers discharged by their employers may have recourse in 
both the aforementioned and other antiretaliation statutory provisions. 
Such provisions, though are not necessarily a paradigm to be followed 
in providing for general whistleblower protection. Antiretaliation pro-
visions in employment statutes are part of an overall statutory scheme 
to guarantee specific statutory rights to employees. These provisions 
are interpreted in light of that statutory scheme, 156 which embodies 
a legislative decision to rely on employees in the enforcement of the 
such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or 
others of any right afforded by this chapter. 
Id. at § 660(c)(I). 
150. See Power City Electric, Inc., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 123,947 (E.D. Wash. 1979); 
Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1977). 
151. See American Atomics, Inc., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 24,254 (D. Ariz. 1980). 
152. See Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Pa. 1976). 
153. See Marshall v. Klug & Smith Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) I 162 (D.N.D. 1979). 
154. See Lummus Co., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 24,465 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
155. See Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., 73 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1069 (10th Cir. 1978); 
Express Container Services, Inc., 1980 O.S.H. Dec._ (CCH) 1 24,765 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
156. [A]bundant support can be found under [The NLRA and FLSA] for the conclusion 
here that protection must be afforded to those who seek the benefit of statutes designed 
by Congress to equalize employer and employee in matters of employment .... The 
balance is ... struck in favor of the employee in order to afford him the enunciated 
protection from invidious discrimination, by protecting his right to file charges. 
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 441 F.2d 998, 1006-07 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 415 
F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted). 
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statute. 157 They are thus interpreted with a view toward encouraging 
employees to report violations. 
Any general standard for dealing with the discharged whistle blower, 
on the other hand, should protect him but should not affirmatively 
encourage others to whistleblow. Relying on employee vigilantees is 
not necessarily sound general law enforcement policy, 158 for encouraging 
rather than simply protecting whistleblowing may have serious negative 
consequences. Many who urge that the law should encourage whistle-
blowing argue that in matters involving public health and safety the 
employee's duty of loyalty to his employer is overridden by a duty 
of loyalty to society. 159 This view fails to recognize that the nature 
of the suggested duty to whistleblow in the interests of protecting society 
may shift with changes in the opinions and perceptions of the majority 
of the population. Individuals who manipulate public opinions and 
perceptions may also manipulate the suggested duty to whistleblow. 
157. The Supreme Court has emphasized this on several occasions. In interpreting the FLSA, 
the Court has stated: 
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance 
with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection 
of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees 
seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement 
could thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with their 
grievances. This end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) against discharges and other 
discriminatory practices was designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that 
fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved emp!oyees quietly 
to accept substandard conditions. 
Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). Similarly, the Court has explained 
the rationale behind the NLRA's antiretaliation provision: 
Implementation of the Act is dependent upon the initiative of individual persons who 
must, as petitioner has done here, invoke its sanctions through filing an unfair labor-
practice charge. Congress has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information 
about such practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting them to the 
Board. This is shown by its adoption of § 8(a)(4) which makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges. 
Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967) (footnote omitted); accord, NLRB 
v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1972). The decision to rely on employee assistance in enforce-
ment has also accompanied antiretaliation provisions in statutes outside the employment context. 
See supra note 72. 
158. Compare C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR 213-16 (1975) (suggesting that encouraging whistleblowing will assist in controlling 
illegal corporate behavior) with Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical 
View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1146-47 
(1977) (arguing that reliance on whistleblowers may be unrealistic and counterproductive). In 
Michigan, some evidence indicates that since the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Act 
employees have felt freer to report the illegal dumping of toxic substances to appropriate authorities, 
thereby facilitating enforcement of environmental laws. The Laws Are Working, Lansing State 
J., July 21, 1981, a A-6, col. I. 
159. See, e.g., C. STONE, supra, note 158 at 213; R. NADER, P. PETKAS & K. BLACKWELL, 
WHISTLE BLOWING (1972); Chalk, The Miners' Canary, 38 BULL. ATOMIC Sc1., Feb. 1982 at 
16, Edsall, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, 188 SCI. 687 (1975). See also James, In Defense 
of Whistleblowing, in W.M. HOFFMAN & J.M. MOORE, eds., BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND 
CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY (forthcoming 1984). . 
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Many of the arguments currently being advanced for encouraging 
whistleblowing to promote public health and safety were also advanced 
in the late 1940's and early 1950's to justify exposing Truman ad-
ministration officials and private employers alleged to be "soft on 
communism." 160 Any ·general standard of whistleblower protection 
should be structured to avoid encouraging an informant mentality which 
can result in abusive invasions of privacy or suppression of unpopular 
views and lifestyles. 161 
Whether the utility of broad statutory antiretaliation provisions need 
to be re-examined is beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear, 
however, that because statutory antiretaliation provisions rely upon 
employees to help enforce the statute, caution must be exercised in 
analogizing many of the broad interpretations of those provisions to 
standards for general whistleblower protection. Certainly Title VII's 
protection of maliciously filed false charges should not be generally 
extended to the bad faith whistleblower in the absence of an explicit 
legislative determination that the need for employee participation in 
enforcement outweighs the employer's interest in being free from 
malicious defamation. Nor should other aspects of specific statutory 
antiretaliation provisions - protection regardless of whether the 
employee resorts to available internal channels before reporting the 
employer to government authorities and reinstatement as a typical 
remedy for illegal discharge - automatically be incorporated into more 
general standards of protection. 
Paradoxically, although statutory antiretaliation provisions are in most 
respects too broad to serve as a model for whistleblower protection, 
they are also too narrow. Statutory language has been interpreted to 
deny protection to employees in situations where they reported in good 
faith what they believed to be violations of the statute. Both the 
NLRA 162 and OSHA163 have been so limited, as have some state an-
tiretaliation statutes. For example, in Bryant v. Dayton Casket Co., 164 
plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he told his employer he in-
tended to file a workers' compensation claim. His compensation claim 
was actually filed after his discharge. Relying on what it viewed as 
plain statutory language, the court held that the plaintiff was not pro-
tected by the Ohio workers' compensation statute's prohibition of 
retaliation against an employee who has "filed a claim or instituted, 
160. See A. WESTIN, WHISTI.EBLOWING: LoYALTY AND DISS.ENT IN THE CoRPORATION 135 (1981). 
161. See Bok, Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility, II N.Y.U., Eo.Q., 2, 9 (1980) 
("In many societies, citizens are asked to report deviations, fellow workers to spy on one another, 
and students to expose the subversive views of their teachers. No society can afford t"o ignore 
these precedents in its enthusiasm for eradicating corruption."). 
162. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text. 
163. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text. 
164. 69 Ohio St. 2d 367, 433 N.E.2d 142 (1982). 
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pursued or testified in any case proceeding under the workers' com-
pensation act." Thus, it appears that in Ohio employees filing workers' 
compensation claims are protected from retaliation only if they can 
file faster than their employers can fire. Clearly, the piecemeal ap-
proach of including antiretaliation provisions in statutes primarily 
designed to accomplish other objectives is no substitute for general 
whistleblower protection. 
B. The Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act 
On January 17, 1981, Michigan became the first jurisdiction to pro-
vide general statutory whistleblower protection. 165 The Michigan 
Whistleblowers' Protection Act ("MWPA") 166 prohibits employers 
from retaliating against an employee because the employee "reports 
or is about to report . . . a violation or a suspected violation of a 
law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, 
a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public 
body, unless the employee knows that the report is false .... " 167 Public 
bodies are employees and bodies of the three branches of state govern-
ment, local governing bodies and their employees, and law enforcement 
agencies and their employees. 168 Violators are subject to private civil 
actions for reinstatement, back pay, restoration of fringe benefits and 
seniority rights, actual damages, costs, and attorney fees. 169 Plaintiffs 
alleging that retaliation occurred because they were about to report 
a violation are required to prove their case by clear and convincing 
evidence. 170 A recent amendment denies protection to employees who 
disclose information entitled to confidentiality conferred by statute or 
common law. 111 
The Michigan statute was intended to encourage employees to assist 
in enforcing federal, state, and local statutes and regulations; conse-
quently, it actively promotes whistleblowing. In a speech on the floor 
of the Michigan House of Representatives, Representative James Barcia, 
the legislation's principal sponsor, urged its adoption to encourage 
employees to fulfill their societal duty to participate in law enforce-
165. 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts 469 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-.369). A 
similar statute providing for general whistleblower protection has since been enacted in Connecticut. 
1982 Conn. Pub. Acts 289, effective October 1, 1982, prohibits the discharge of an employee 
"because the employee . . . reports, verbally or in writing, a violation or suspected violation 
of any state or federal law or regulation or any municipal ordinance or regulation to a public body." 
166. 1980 MICH. Pua. ACTS 469. 
167. Id. sec. 2. 
168. Id. sec. l(d). 
169. Id. §§ 3, 4. Violators are also subject to civil fines up to $500. Id. § 5(1). 
170. Id. § 3(4). 
171. 1982 MICH. Pua. ACTS 146. 
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ment, particularly when dealing with large and impersonal governmental 
institutions or businesses. 112 A Michigan House Legislative Analysis 
reiterates this purpose. 173 Because the Act encourages whistleblowing 
as a means of law enforcement, it contains many of the deficiencies 
of statutory antiretaliation provisions. 
The MWP A imposes no requirement that in appropriate circumstances 
employees utilize internal channels before publicly blowing the whistle. 
This omission appears to have been deliberate, as amendments imposing 
such a requirement were proposed to Representative Barcia prior to 
the Act's passage. 174 The omission not only fails to give employers the 
initial opportunity to correct their own violations, but may actually 
encourage employees to bypass their employers' internal procedures. 
Nowhere does the Act explicitly protect employees pursuing internal 
avenues from retaliation. Courts interpreting the Act have available 
to them analogies to FLSA and OSHA cases which extend antiretalia-
tion protections to complaints made directly to the employer. The 
MWPA, however, differs from the FLSA and OSHA in two respects. 
First, it treats employees about to report violations differently from 
those who have actually reported violations by requiring that the former 
prove their cases by clear and convincing evidence. Second, it is rather 
explicit in protecting reports to public bodies and in defining public 
bodies as state and local government and law enforcement agencies. Thus, 
a strong argument can be made that the statute intentionally reduces 
employee protection the further removed the employee is from com-
plaining to governmental authorities. Thus, employees discharged while 
pursuing internal avenues may have difficulty convincing the courts 
that the statute applies to them at all. Alternately, such employees may 
be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were 
about to report the violation to a public body - a requirement that 
they will usually be unable to meet because using internal channels 
usually enables the employee to def er the decision of whether to go 
public. ·Even if the Michigan courts ultimately accept the FLSA and 
OSHA analogies, until the ambiguity is clarified, employees wishing 
to maximize their chances for statutory protection would be well ad-
vised to bypass internal channels. 
In addition to its apparent failure to protect employees using internal 
channels, the MWPA on its face does not protect employees who re-
port violations to the federal government even though this will usually 
172. Rep. Barcia's speech is reprinted in a set of materials on the Act available from his 
office in Lansing, Michigan (on file with the Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter cited as Barcia 
Speech]. 
173. MICH. HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, H.B. s.5088 & 5089, First Analysis (Apr. 17, 1980). 
174. Letter from Alan F. Westin to Rep. James A. Barcia, (November 22, 1980) (copy on 
file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
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be the most appropriate course of action for violations of federal law. 
It also fails to extend protection in the few circumstances under which 
it may be appropriate to report violations to parties other than public 
bodies. 
The MWPA is ambiguous concerning the degree to which employees 
must point to specific statutes or regulations that employers allegedly 
have violated. Arguably, employees are protected whenever they allege 
in good faith that their employers acted illegally even though in reality 
no statute or regulation was violated. Although a preliminary draft 
of the NWP A deprived employees of protection if reports they filed 
were false, upon recommendation of the Michigan Department of Labor 
this provision was limited to employees who knowingly file false reports. 
The purpose of the change was to protect employees "if they, in good 
faith, report a violation which later proves groundless." 175 
An equally strong argument can be made, however, that the final 
version of the MWP A only covers employees who are mistaken as to 
facts rather than law. The term false usually refers to factual represen-
tations rather than legal conclusions. An employee may know that his 
employer acted wrongfully, but be unable to point to specific statutes 
or regulations that have been violated. Such an employee may be acting 
at his peril if the employer's activity is subsequently found to be legal. 
The degree of protection provided for employees who file false reports 
is further clouded by the Act's failure to indicate whether the employee's 
knowledge of the falsity is to be measured by an objective or subjective 
standard. An objective standard could result in an implied duty to make 
a reasonable investigation prior to blowing the whistle. The Act's 
legislative history, however, indicates that a subjective standard was 
intended. Representative Barcia, in responding to criticisms that 
employees generally lack sufficient knowledge to distinguish and report 
violations, did not aver any employee duty to investigate. Instead, he 
appears to have assumed that employee complaints would be based 
on incomplete and perhaps inaccurate information, and argued that 
no real harm would come to the employer because the ultimate issue 
of guilt or innocence would be initially decided by the public body, 
then by the enforcement agency, and finally by the courts, thereby 
affording the employer ample opportunity to clear itself. 116 Such a sub-
jective standard is not desirable. A false report made in ignorance is 
protected, while the employee who investigates before filing charges 
risks being found to have had knowledge of the falsity. Thus, a sub-
jective standard may actually discourage employees from investigating 
and verifying their suspicions before reporting their employers. 
175. MICH. DEPT. OF LABOR, ANALYSIS OF H.B. 5089, at 2 (Feb. 7, 1980). 
176. Barcia Speech, supra note 172. 
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Finally, the MWP A treats the whistleblower's motive, be it based on 
high principle or retalitory spite, as irrelevant. Beyond the requirement 
that the employee not know that the charge is false, it imposes no 
requirement of good faith. This is consistent with the MWPA's purpose 
to use employees as a resource in law enforcement. To fulfill this pur-
pose, the Michigan statute is concerned with the accuracy of the 
employee's information rather than his motive in coming forward. 
These deficiencies stem from the Act's goal of encouraging employees 
to blow the whistle on illegal employer activity. This goal entails an 
assumption that whistleblowing presents a conflict between a duty of 
loyalty to employer and a higher duty of loyalty to society. The ex-
istence of such a conflict - and how the conflict should be resolved 
- is usually asserted without any meaningful analysis of either duty. 
Such analysis, though, must be the initial inquiry in any effort to 
establish a standard of whistleblower protection. 
C. A Proposed Standard for Whistleblower Protection 
Some philosophers have argued that the concept of loyalty to a cor-
poration is a red herring because loyalty requires a mutual bond tying 
people to each other - reciprocity which a corporation is incapable 
of giving. 111 Nevertheless, the concept of loyalty to employer is deeply 
rooted in American industrial relations. 178 The leading judicial discus-
sion of employee loyalty is NLRB v. Local 1229, International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 119 During the course of a labor 
dispute, technicians employed by a television station publically 
distributed handbills attacking the quality of the station's programming, 
and were discharged. The Court affirmed the NLRB's finding that the 
employees' actions were disloyal and thus not entitled to protection 
under the NLRA. The Court observed that the employees' handbill 
was not related to the labor dispute, made no reference to wages or 
working conditions, was not related to matters within the scope of the 
employees' responsibility, and did not appeal for public support. Ac-
cordingly, the Court characterized the employees' actions as "a con-
tinuing attack, initiated while off duty, upon the very interests which 
the attackers were being paid to conserve and develop" 180 and con-
cluded that "[n]othing would contribute less to the Act's declared pur-
pose of promoting industrial peace and stability." 18 1 
177. See, e.g., Ladd, Collective and Individual Moral Responsibility in Engineering; Some 
Questions, (paper presented to Second National Conference on Ethics in Engineering (Chicago) 
(March 5, 1982)) 7 (copy on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
178. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. 
179. 346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
180. Id. at 476. 
181. Id. 
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The principle of Local 1229 raises the critical question whether 
reasonable and responsible whistleblowing amounts to disloyalty. For 
purposes of analysis, whistleblowing may be divided into two types: 
internal, that is within the employer's structure, and external, that is 
to government authorities or other third parties. 
Internal whistleblowing does not carry with it such dangers implicit 
in external whistleblowing as unjustified harm to the employer's reputa-
tion or the unjustified expense of defending against incorrect allega-
tions. Internal whistleblowing ultimately may save the corporation from 
damage to its reputation and defense costs by enabling it to correct 
its wrongdoing before its actions become a matter of public 
knowledge. 182 In some of the most notorious corporate scandals in 
history upper level managers were unaware of corporate misconduct. 
For example, no senior level manager was involved in the price fixing 
conspiracies in the electrical industry in the 1950's. 183 In the corporate 
bribery scandals of the 1970's lower level management was responsible 
for the conduct in most of the cases, 184 and in those instances where 
the bribery was directed by senior management, members of the board 
of directors were unaware of the illegal activity. 185 
The isolation of directors and senior managers from lower level 
managers has been attributed to the tendency of managers on a lower 
level to act to maximize the interests and autonomy of their units rather 
than the interests of the corporation. 186 The effects of this "subgoal 
pursuit" are aggravated by an "authority leakage" whereby general 
policies set by upper level management lose their authority as they are 
reinterpreted, distorted, and qualified in the process of being relayed 
to successive lower levels. 181 The isolation of upper level management 
is completed by the tendency to restrict the flow to upper level manage-
ment of information which is adverse to the interests of the subunit. 188 
Thus, accusations that the employee who blows the whistle internally 
on employer misconduct is disloyal come from the perspective of the 
subgoal pursuits of a lower level manager. Where the employee reports 
activity which furthers the interests of a subunit but conflicts with the 
182. For examples where internal whistleblowing could have saved corporate reputations and 
finances, see Ewing, The Employees Right to Speak Out, 5 Crv. LIB. REV. 10 (Sept.-Oct. 1978). 
183. Coffee, supra note 158, at 1132. 
184. Id. at 1104-05 n.11 and accompanying text. 
185. Id. at 1127-29. 
186. Id. at I 135. 
187. Id. at 1136-37. 
188. Id. at 1137-38. Consequently, a Harvard Business Review survey's finding that even 
though 80% of the responding executives believed in the abstract that "business people should 
try to live up to an absolute moral standard rather than to the moral standard of their peer 
group," 50% believed their superiors do not want to know how results are obtained as long 
as they achieve the desired outcome is not surprising. Brenner & Molander, Is the Ethics of 
Business Changing?, 55 HARV. Bus. REv., Jan-Feb, 1977, at 57, 62. 
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general interests of the firm the only disloyalty exhibited by the employee 
is to the subunit. The employee's actions exhibit loyalty of a high degree 
to the firm as a whole. 189 
Most managers appear to recognize that employees owe loyalty to 
the firm rather than to the subunit. In a Harvard Business Review 
survey, readers were presented with the following hypothetical. A sales 
executive, concerned that a new product was unsafe, first complained 
to his field sales manager, then voiced his fears to the district manager 
and finally to the regional head. Unsuccessful at each level, the salesman 
eventually went to the vice president of marketing, who fired him for 
being insubordinate to the sales managers and for being a nuisance. 
Of the almost 2000 business persons responding to the survey, 96% 
stated that they would not have taken the same action had they been 
vice president, and 87% stated that had they been chief executive of 
the company, they would have opposed the vice president's action. 190 
The business community, then, appears to support overwhelmingly the 
internal whistle blower. 
The loyalty of the external whistleblower has engendered the most 
debate. This debate has focused first on a perceived conflict between 
the employee's duty of loyalty to society and his duty of loyalty to 
the employer and second on how to balance properly these conflicting 
duties. With respect to both concerns, the debate is misguided. 
Although an employee may have a moral obligation to prevent harm 
by publicly reporting his employer's wrongdoing, 191 it does not follow 
that he has a comparable legal duty. Generally, even with respect to 
· · felonies, the only legal duty an individual has is not to aid affirma-
tively in concealment. There is no independent duty to report an 
offense. 192 Moreover, the typical whistleblower does not perceive himself 
as a moralist protecting societal interests. Most decisions to discuss 
employer misconduct are deeply personal ones stemming from the ·em-
ployee's individual conscience. 193 Thus, the interests that weigh in favor 
of providing legal protection for the external whistleblower are not 
those embodied in an employee's obligation to society, but rather those 
embodied in his interest as an individual to act in accordance with 
the dictates of his conscience. 194 
189. Cf. C. & P. Tel. Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 457 (1968) (Serber, Arb.). 
190. Ewing, What Business Thinks About Employee Rights, 55 HARV. Bus. REv., Sept-Oct, 
1977, at 81, 88. 
191. See James, supra note 159, at 9-10. 
192. See supra note 14. 
193. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
194. The general mischaracterization of the interests which weigh in favor of protecting the 
whistleblower is analogous to the courts' mischaracterization of the tort of abusive discharge. 
As Part I showed, courts have developed the tort to protect societal interests rather than to 
ensure employee rights. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
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Balanced against this basic individual interest is the employee's duty 
of loyalty to the employer. The employer's claim to his employee's 
silence presupposes that an incorrect or inappropriate public disclosure 
can harm the firm. Thus, the duty of loyalty requires a potential 
whistleblower to take every measure that a reasonable employee would 
take to insure the accuracy and appropriateness of the disclosures. For 
example, disclosure usually will be i-Irappropriate where resort to 
available internal channels could correct the problem. 
Once this obligation to insure the accuracy and appropriateness of 
disclosure is fulfilled, insistence on employee silence amounts to in-
sistence on blind obedience. Philosophers and managers tend to agree 
that loyalty does not include blind obedience. From a philosophical 
perspective, loyalty demands that which is morally due the object of 
loyalty. Blind obedience has no moral value because it is not something 
which is morally due. 195 
Although some managers insiste on blind obedience, 196 most do not. 
In the Harvard Business Review survey noted above, 610/o agreed that 
if the whistle blower ''believes sincerely he is acting in the best interests 
of customers, stockholders or the community, he should be respected 
and not penalized," 197 and almost 900/o disagree with the boss who 
fires a bus driver for speaking out on a safety violation. 198 In contrast, 
only a third agree that a whistleblower who does not like the company 
should leave it 199 and fewer than a tenth believe that the whistleblower 
should be penalized if his disclosures hurt sales or customer relations. 200 
Neither philosophical theory nor contemporary business mores favor 
blind obedience to the employer. Thus, when an employee has taken 
the precaution required by the duty of loyalty to ensure appropriateness 
and accuracy of the disclosure, only the employer's illegitimate insistance 
on blind obedience weighs against the employee's interest in acting in 
accordance with conscience. In such circumstances the law should protect 
the whistleblower from retalitory discharge. 
195. See LASS, Loyalty, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 97-98 (1972). 
196. A frequently quoted proponent of blind obedience is former General Motors chairman 
James Roche: 
Some critics are now busy eroding support of free enterprise - the loyalty of a manage-
ment team, with its unifying values of cooperative work. Some of the enemies of business 
now encourage an employee to be disloyal to the enterprise. They want to create suspicion 
and disharmony, and pry into the proprietary interests of the business. However this 
is labeled - industrial espionage, whistleblowing, or professional responsibility - it 
is another tactic for spreading disunity and creating conflict. 
Roche, The Competitive System, to Work, to Preserve, and to Protect, in VITAL SPEECHES OF 
THE DAY, 445 (1971). 
197. Ewing, supra note 190, at 91. 
198. Id. at 93. 
199. Id. at 91. 
200. Id. 
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The above formulation of the competing interests of employer and 
employee suggests two independent standards that a whistleblower must 
meet to be entitled to protection: subjective good faith and objective 
reasonableness. These standards should be used by arbitrators in deter-
mining whether the discharge of a whistleblower is for just cause, by 
courts in developing the tort of abusive discharge, and by legislatures 
in enacting whistleblower protection legislation. 
1. Subjective good faith- A requirement of subjective good faith 
assures that the law will protect the employee's interest in acting in 
accordance with his conscience without encouraging the employee having 
ulterior motives for whistleblowing: a subjective good faith limitation 
protects the employer from employee harassment. Evidence that the 
right to file safety complaints under OSHA has been abused to further 
ulterior motives201 supports a subjective good faith requirement. More-
over, the employee who acts in bad faith is not asserting a legitimate 
petsonal right and should not be entitled to legal protection. Concerns 
similar to these prompted the Louisiana legislature to include a good 
faith requirement in its recently enacted statute protecting from retalia-
tion employees who report violations of environmental laws. 202 Although 
the Michigan legislature rejected employer requests for a similar limita-
tion in the MWP A, 203 that statute is more concerned with actively pro-
moting whistleblowing as a means of law enforcement than with merely 
protecting individual rights. 204 
2. Objective reasonableness- A requirement of objective 
reasonableness guarantees that the employee fulfills his obligations of 
loyalty to the employer. The employee should be required to act as 
a similarly situated reasonable employee would act under the cir-
cumstances. Objective reasonableness is a standard with which the courts 
are quite familiar. It embodies the common understanding of when 
and how to act. The standard places a burden on the employee which, 
by definition, the employee is capable of meeting. It leaves the employee 
to act at his peril only to the limited extent that his individual 
peculiarities deviate from acceptable average conduct. 205 Although oc-
201. See H. NORTHRUP, R. RowAN & C. PERRY, THE IMPACT OF OSHA 134-41 (1978). 
202. 1981 La. Acts 280, sec. l(A). See Minutes of Meeting, La. House Committee on Natural 
Resources 4 (May 21, 1981). The official minutes reflect only that the bill was amended in com-
mittee to add the good faith requirement. A tape recording of the Committee meeting, available 
from the Committee, reflects that the amendment responded to fears raised by State Representa-
tive Ullo that "there are so many small areas that can be considered a violation, if you have 
an employee that's a real habitual agitator, he could really use this to an advantage where he 
can make it really unbearable for the employer." 
203. See, e.g., Letter from William J. Stuart to Rep. James A. Barcia (Oct. 31, 1980); Letter 
from Keith J. McLeod, to Rep. James A. Barcia (Oct. 28, 1980) (copies on file with the Journal 
of Law Reform). See also supra note 172. 
204. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
205. See generally O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 86-87 (1963 ed.). 
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casionally well-intentioned but overly suspicious whistleblowers may 
find themselves unprotected, protection should not be extended to them 
at the employer's expense. 
Moreover, objective reasonableness is a standard that is sufficiently 
flexible to accomodate various fact situations and to account for such 
factors as the nature of the employer's alleged wrongdoing and the 
whistleblower's position within the firm. The issue is not whether a 
reasonable employee necessarily would have acted in the same manner, 
but is rather whether a reasonable employee in a similar position would 
consider the employee's actions in question to be reasonable. Although 
the standard must be developed on a case by case basis, several factors 
are likely to figure prominently in almost all cases. 
a. Employer conduct- Current common law and statutory pro-
tection encompasses, if anyone, employees who disclose their employer's 
violations of statutes or administrative regulations. Such a standard 
is far too narrow, though, as some activity generally regarded as im-
proper does not violate any statute or regulation. For example, respon-
sible officials of the Ford Motor Company were aware in 1971 that 
the gas tanks on its Pintos were vulnerable to rupture in twenty miles 
per hour rear-end collisions and that the defect could be cured by a 
modification costing only ten dollars per car. The tank was not modified 
until the 1977 model year, when federal safety standards for gas tanks 
were issued. Thus, from 1971 through 1976 Ford marketed a car which 
it knew was unnecessarily dangerous but which did not violate any 
federal statute or regulation. 206 Protected disclosure should not be limited 
to statutory violations but should include disclosures of conduct that 
a reasonable person would regard as wrongful. 201 
Disclosure of wrongful activity, however, may not always be ap-
propriate. For example, it would not be appropriate for an employee 
of a bus company to reveal that five years ago the company used defec-
tive buses if all such buses have been removed from service. 208 
Protected disclosures should be limited to conduct generally regarded 
as wrongful. It should not extend to employee-employer differences 
of opinion or judgment. In such instances, even though the employee 
in good conscience dissents from the employer's views, the employee's 
right to act in accordance with his conscience should not be transformed 
into a license to impose his personal values on the employer. Instead, 
206. See generally DeGeorge, Ethical Responsibilities of Engineers in Large Organizations: 
The Pinto Case (unpublished manuscript presented to the National Conference on Engineering 
Ethics, June 20-22, 1980) (copy on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
207. DeGeorge appears to sanction this standard when he suggests that employees be permitted 
to go public with information about the safety of a product only if the harm that will be done 
by the product to the public is serious and considerable. Id. 
208. The example is suggested in Bok, supra note 161, at 2. 
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his duty of loyalty requires that he refrain from publicly opposing the 
employer's judgment. 209 
b. The employee's position with the employer- The standard of 
objective reasonableness will also adapt to the individual whistleblower's 
position and job responsibilities. For example, the degree of expertise 
possessed by the employee will affect what constitutes a reasonable 
belief in the accuracy of the disclosure. The employee's position in 
the firm may also influence his access to and consequently his duty 
to exhaust available internal channels. 
c. Exhaustion of available internal channels- Where internal 
channels for complaining of employer misconduct exist, the employee's 
duty of loyalty generally mandates that such channels be used. The 
duty of loyalty implies a correlative duty to avoid harming the employer 
through inaccurate or inappropriate disclosure. Resorting to internal 
channels may furnish the employee with additional information and 
forestall an inaccurate disclosure, or may result in the problem's cor-
rection and prevent a needless disclosure. There may, however, be some 
instances in which failure to exhaust internal channels is justified. 
Therefore, the failure to exhaust available internal channels should give 
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the employee has acted 
unreasonably. 210 
A rule that presumptively requires exhaustion of internal channels 
produces two benefits. First, the rule encourages employers to provide 
internal channels through which employees can voice dissent. Many 
such systems are already in effect; two that have been cited frequently 
as being particularly effective are the systems utilized by IBM and the 
Allied Corporation. 211 Ideally, if all employers made such systems 
available, external whistleblowing would be unnecessary. This should 
be a goal of any set of legal rules to protect whistleblowers. 
Second, channeling whistleblowing into internal procedures helps 
focus attention on the object of the complaint rather than on the person-
ality of the whistleblower. Whistleblowers who bypass internal channels 
engender suspicion that their primary objective is personal publicity 
rather than correction of the problem. Their credibility is damaged 
and the situation frequently develops into an adversarial confronta-
209. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). 
210. The presumption may be overcome by showing that exhaustion would be futile or, perhaps, 
by a showing analogous to the OSHA rule allowing employees to refuse to work under condi-
tions reasonably believed to pose an imminent risk of death or serious injury where there is 
insufficient time or opportunity to seek redress from their employer or apprise OSHA of the 
danger. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). 
211. See Cook, Whistleblowers: Friend or Foe?, INDUS. WEEKLY, Oct. 5, 1981, at 50, 53-54; 
see also Office of Management and Program Analysis, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
A Survey of Policies and Procedures Applicable to the Expression of Differing Professional 
Opinions. 
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tion in which the reason for the initial complaint is lost. 212 
Internal channels are only effective, though, if employees know they 
are available. Moreover, the system must be structured to discourage 
employees from bypassing it. Employees will only utilize an internal 
complaint procedure to the extent that it is credible - and its credibility, 
in turn, depends on strong· guarantees against reprisals for using the 
system. 213 Such guarantees should be legally enforceable through a cause 
of action for their breach; moreover, if such guarantees are not made 
the employee should not be obligated to exhaust internal channels. 214 
d. Accuracy of the disclosure- Employees' duty of loyalty requires 
that they have an objectively reasonable belief in the accuracy of their 
disclosures. This will usually involve reasonable investigation and 
verification, much of which can be accomplished through internal chan-
nels. Factors to be considered include the complexity of the informa-
tion they are revealing, the employee's access to corroborating infor-
mation, and the employee's expertise in the area. 
e. To whom may the whistle be blown?- The duty of loyalty re-
quires that even if internal channels have failed, information damag-
ing to the employer must be revealed only to appropriate parties. In 
cases involving statutory violations, the appropriate party will usually 
be the government enforcement authority. It may also include customers 
and other parties but only if the violation poses an immediate danger 
to those parties, or if the impropriety does not involve a statutory viola-
tion. In some cases,· it may remain inappropriate to blow the whistle 
publicly even though internal channels have failed. For example, an 
attorney should not reveal information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. 
Ill. REMEDIES FOR UNJUST DISCHARGE 
At common law, courts of equity refused to order specific perfor-
mance of employment agreements. 215 Today, grievance procedures in 
collective bargaining agreements and statutory protections have made 
reinstatement a common remedy for wrongfully discharged employees. 
It may seem reasonable then, that the protection provided to at-will 
employees should include reinstatement as a remedy. 216 In the case of 
the discharged whistleblower, however, except where the discharge con-
212. See Chalk, supra note 159; Chalk & von Hippe!, Due Process for Dissenting "Whistle-
Blowers", TECH. REV. June-July 1979, at 48, 55. 
213. Conference Board, Non Union Complaint Systems: A Corporate Appraisal 8-9 (1980). 
214. Cf. State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 208-09, 94 N.W.2d 711, 720-21 (1959). 
215. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.6 (1982). 
216. See generally CoMM. ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, At-Will Employment and the Prob-
lem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170, 196 (1981); Summers, supra note 6, at 531. 
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travenes a collective bargaining agreement, reinstatement may be un-
workable and inappropriate. 
A. Collective Bargaining Agreements 
In most collective bargaining agreements, the employer contractual-
ly agrees both to just cause limitations on its right of discharge and 
to an arbitration procedure. Together these provisions give an employee 
a contractual right to employment so long as he does not engage in 
conduct constituting just cause for discharge. Given the nature of this 
contractual right, reinstatement usually is an essential part of the remedy 
where the right has been infringed, 211 although the parties remain free 
-to limit the remedy by contractual agreement. 218 
The whistleblower discharged in breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement need not be treated differently than any other employee 
discharged without just cause. Any reinstatement order would be based 
on a contractual right for which the employee has bargained and to 
which his employer has voluntarily agreed. The collective bargaining 
agreement embodying that right is an essential part of an ongoing rela-
tionship between the employer and the union; reinstatement is a well-
established and mutually acceptable aspect of that agreement. 
Reinstatement of the whistleblower discharged in violation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement is not only appropriate from an historical 
perspective; it is also an eminently workable remedy. An empirical study 
of reinstatement ordered by arbitrators in discharge cases between 1950 
and 1955219 showed that almost all of the employees offered reinstate-
ment pursuant to an arbitration order actually returned to their jobs. 
Only 12 out of 123 did not. 220 The study further shows that employers 
generally accept the reinstated employee and do not seek to retaliate 
against him: 650/o responded that since reinstatement the employee per-
formed satisfactorily, 221 640/o said that he made normal occupational 
progress, 222 700/o said he presented no subsequent disciplinary prob-
lems, 223 and 710/o reported that supervisors' attitudes were favorable 
or neutral toward the reinstated employee. 224 The employer's responses 
are particularly impressive because in 610/o of the cases, including many 
217. See generally 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 281 
(1973); M. HILL & A. SINICORPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 42 (198(). 
218. See, e.g., Consumers Oil Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 141 (1981) (Hill, Arb.). 
219. Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: What Happens After Reinstatement, in CRITICAL 
ISSUES IN LABOR ARBITRATION 21 (1957). 
220. Id. at 33. 
22 I. Id. at 34. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 35. 
224. Id. 
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where the post-reinstatement experience with the employee was 
favorable, the employer remained convinced that the arbitrator's award 
had been wrong. 225 These findings have also been confirmed in a more 
recent study. 226 Thus, it appears that though employers often disagree 
with the arbitrators' decisions, they accept these decisions and do not 
work to undermine them. 
B. Absence of Collective Bargaining 
Outside the collective bargaining context, reinstatement is not a 
remedy to which the employer contractually agrees; instead, it must 
be imposed on the employer by statute or judicial fiat. Unlike the 
employee reinstated by the arbitrator, the employee discharged in viola-
tion of a statute usually does not have a union to support him once 
reinstated and to discourage the employer who is tempted to retaliate. 
Moreover, reinstatement is not institutionalized as it is in an ongoing 
union-employer collective bargaining relationship. 
The available empirical evidence indicates that under these cir-
cumstances, reinstatement is not a workable or desirable remedy. A 
study of employees ordered reinstated after being discharged for at-
tempting to organize a union in violation of the NLRA showed that 
over half declined to be reinstated. 221 Almost a third of these did so 
even though he or she had no alternative job at the time. 228 The study 
also revealed that if the union had been successful in its organizing 
drive, the employee was far more likely to accept reinstatement than 
where the union drive had failed. 229 This finding demonstrates the im-
portance of the union to a workable reinstatement remedy. Of the 87 
employees who refused reinstatement, 78 gave reasons for their refusals: 
39 expressed fear of company retaliation as a reason while 10 stated 
that financial need caused them to accept settlement offers of back 
pay without reinstatement. 230 Moreover, their fears of company retalia-
tion were evidently justified. Of 85 employees who returned to their 
jobs, 60 subsequently left the company, 40 of them due to employer 
225. Id. at 36. 
226. Malinowski, An Empirical Analysis of Discharge Cases and The Work History of 
Employees Reinstated by Labor Arbitrators, 36 ARB. J. 31 (1981). Another study also confirm-
ed the Ross findings except for the finding that employers disagreed with the arbitrator's deci-
sion. McDermott & Newhams, Discharge - Reinstatement: What Happens Thereafter, 24 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 526 (1971). 
227. L. Aspen, A Study of Reinstatement Under the National Labor Relations Act 15 (1966) 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Mass. Institute of Technology). 
228. Id. at 22. 
229. Id. at 25-26. Among the employees who accepted reinstatement, however, the success 
of the union drive was irrelevant to whether reinstatement was ultimately successful. Id. at 47-48. 
230. Id. at 38-39. 
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retaliation. Of 23 employees placed on preferential hiring lists, none 
were ever recalled by the employer. 231 On the basis of the experiences 
of employees who remained with the employer, the study concluded 
that reinstatement was an effective remedy at best in only 30% of the 
cases and possibly in only 10% of the cases. 232 Subsequent studies have 
confirmed these findings. 233 
It thus appears that often times the reinstatement order has the ironic 
effect of transforming an unlawful discharge into a "voluntary" resigna-
tion. From the discharged employee's perspective, a more complete 
damages remedy may be preferable to reinstatement. In western Europe, 
most countries protect employees from discharge without just cause, 
but the remedy of reinstatement is rare. 234 Why, then, does reinstate-
ment remain such a well-entrenched statutory remedy? 
The equitable remedy of reinstatement is part of the overall statutory 
scheme of most protective employment legislation. Reinstatement has 
frequently been characterized as necessary to signal to other employees 
that they need not be afraid to exercise their statutory rights. 235 Thus, 
the reinstatement remedy, like most statutory antiretaliation provisions, 
is intended to encourage employees to exercise their statutory rights. 
Even under these statutes, however, reinstatement has been denied where 
tension and hostility between the discharged employee and the employer 
rendered it extremely impractical to return the employee to a job re-
quiring a close working relationship with his superiors, 236 and where 
the employee was guilty of misconduct. 237 In such instances future 
damages "front pay" have often been awarded. 238 
A complete damage remedy that includes front pay will usually better 
protect the interests of the whistleblower than reinstatement, and will 
not as a general matter encourage whistleblowing. Given this Article's 
premise that the law should protect the whistleblower once he has acted, 
yet avoid encouraging him in the first instance, damages rather than 
reinstatement is the best remedy for the unjust discharge of employees 
who are not entitled by virtue of a collective bargaining agreement to 
equitable reinstatement relief. 
231. Id. at 37. 
232. Id. at 63. 
233. Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357, 359 (1981). 
234. Sherman, Reinstatement as a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Common Market Coun-
tries, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 (1981). 
235. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
236. See, e.g., Vant Hui v. City of Dell Rapids, 462 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.S.D. 1978); EEOC 
v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1309 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
237. Goldberg v. Barna Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1962). 
238. Id. See also EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
aff'd mem. 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Mitchell v. Dyes, 
14 Wages & Hour Cas. (BNA) 484 (S.D. Ala. 1960). 
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CONCLUSION 
Most participants in the debate over whistleblowing perceive the pro-
blem as a conflict between duty to society and duty to employer. This 
view is mistaken; the real issue is what balance should be struck bet-
ween the individual's interest in acting according to his conscience and 
the employer's interests in his employee's silence. Although the in-
dividual's interest may be outweighed by his duty of loyalty, it is always 
superior to his employer's claim to blind obedience. The law should 
respect this individual interest but should eschew treating the 
whistleblower as a resource to be cultivated in law enforcement. 
Due to their rigid conception of public policy and their failure to 
embrace an individual rights theory of the tort of abusive discharge, 
courts have thus far furnished little protection for whistleblowers. Ar-
bitrators, because of an overbroad characterization of the duty of loyal-
ty, have similarly afforded inadequate protection to these employees. 
Statutory antiretaliation provisions, though protecting whistleblowers 
in certain instances, are an inappropriate model for general whistleblower 
protection because they view the whistleblower as a law enforcement 
resource. 
Both the standard of protection and the damages remedy advocated 
in this Article better accommodate the crucial interests implicated by 
any act of whistleblowing than currently available sources of protec-
tion. Courts and legislatures should keep this standard and remedy 
in mind when fashioning common law tort and statutory causes of 
action for retaliatory discharges of employee whistleblowers. 
